Now, I’m not going to be reviewing the video, the damage it caused is immense and frankly there is nothing important these women have uttered which would warrant a proper deconstruction. The only argument they’ve proven is that we need less women in politics.

Unlike the MAGA women in the video, who came across as confused and unprepared, Dean Withers predictably came out on top. Millions of people watched him, and many were convinced. That’s exactly why he’s worth responding to.

I’m not going to pick apart every point he made, though he got quite a few things factually wrong. Instead, I want to focus on the early portion of the video in which he proclaimed that “men are not better at leading than women”. The reason I want to respond to this in specific is because he dishonestly brought up numerous lines of evidence in support of the unstated (and his actual) claim which is that women are better at leading than men.

In other words, he was defending the thesis that there is a natural equality between the sexes when it comes to leadership skills, but all of his “evidence” pointed out to women actually being better at leading than men.

In the class of logic, if I were to defend a thesis that a population A is equal in a specific trait to population B I would proceed to prove that:

1. The performance of population A is identical to the performance of population B on that particular trait under examination.

OR

2. Show that A outperforms B in some measurable contexts while B outperforms A in other measurable contexts which leads to the conclusion that two populations are comparatively similar.

Because (1) is virtually impossible to prove usually feminists dishonestly cherry-picking their way to defend the (2) second proposition but because Dean Withers is a modern Woke feminist he decided to jump to the (3) third proposition instead! What is the third proposition?

3. Show exclusively that B outperforms A across every metric examined, while presenting zero evidence of A outperforming B in any context and then declare that A and B are equal while subconsciously everyone would conclude that B is superior.

This is the standard tactic of left-wing racial identity politics in which the left explicitly proclaims it believes in equality but implicitly makes the argument for White inferiority and the superiority of non-Whites through media, culture and legislation.

If reality is that Black and Brown men commit a disproportionate amount of rapes and violent crime, the left blames it on White men instead while explicitly stating that there are no group differences in crime.

But regardless of Dean’s dishonesty, the arguments themselves still deserve examination. Because if women genuinely are superior leaders, then an honest truth-seeker has an obligation to report that, regardless of how uncomfortable it makes him. I do not get to dismiss evidence simply because I dislike where it points. That would make me no different from the left-wing ideologues like Dean Withers.

One of the central claims by Dean Withers is that men are more emotional than women because they are violent aka responsible for 93% of all the murders.

First of all, violence is just one aspect of emotion, while men are indeed disproportionately likely to be violent offenders, men are also more likely to support punishing violent offenders with death penalty.

And since violence is an emotion, so is neuroticism, shame, fear and disgust. I explicitly did not mention empathy because it makes women feel good about themselves, but the reality is that neuroticism, shame, fear and other emotions in which women are higher than men are bad emotions and while a minority of men do commit violent crime or abuse their family members, a majority of women experience these negative emotions that are not predisposing them to leadership roles.

Of course, none of the women on the show have brought that up which is not surprising considering that women’s general knowledge and political knowledge in particular is catastrophically low!

Also just a question… Would you let a person lead you if they don’t know what the hell they’re supposed to lead you in? I certainly wouldn’t.

Anyways, if you are curious if men are comparatively emotional than women are no. Women are far-more emotional across the board, because they experience greater emotional intensity, including anger.

[Percentages of men and women who show target emotional facial behaviours (top), mean levels of change from baseline in self-reports of emotion for men and women (middle), and mean levels of change from baseline in skin conductance for men and women (bottom). AN 0/Anger, DI 0/ Disgust, SA 0/Sadness, HA 0/Happiness, PR 0/Pride, and LO 0/Love. ND 0/Non-Duchenne or smiles. *p B/.05.]

Most crucially, is that all of these emotions constantly interplay with each other and make women less resilient to stressful conditions which is what matters for leadership skills, your ability to overcome stress.

Anyways, in the alternative universe of Dean Withers, he goes on to spew more nonsense as if it is already proven beyond shadow of a doubt that men are more emotional than women because they are more violent than women.

His explanation for the essentialist female superiority at controlling their emotions better than men (I kid you not), is because they can give childbirth. Funny enough, he even managed to get fact-checked by Jubilee!

Then Dean Withers also claimed that men’s natural overrepresentation in leadership positions like CEOs are because of societal pressures and not because of innate biological ability. He cited the fact that despite there being much fewer female surgeons, patients undergoing a surgery by a female had lower risks of complications.

I immediately decided to fact-check the claim using a large US study conducted on the topic, and yes, females surgeons were treated patients better by a few percentage points. However the male-female difference in neuroticism is much larger! And most importantly, how the hell are we supposed to reconcile women being slightly better than men at surgeries to women leading men across the board and especially among CEOs?

One may as well interpret this finding as saying that because women display greater empathy than men they are more careful during surgery, but consequently the same would not have been true in jobs requiring strong resistance to disgust or jobs in which fear or shame plays a factor.

If I were Dean Withers and I wanted to make an argument as to why females are better than males at leadership, I would go and explore which qualities make a good leader and then I would prove that since these qualities are more present in women than in men, women are naturally better at leading than men are.

Obviously we know that since men are better than women in virtually all of the qualities which amount to good leadership skills, mean dominate among CEOs, startups and other social positions requiring leadership skills and so it would be impossible for Dean Withers to make this argument so he went with the weird projection that male suck at leadership because of their emotions.

Also, taking strategic risks is essential for effective leadership, and risk-taking is associated with both impulsivity and higher intelligence. Women are less prone to risk-taking, and traits typically coded as negative such as impulsivity and novelty-seeking may actually work in men’s favor, while traits coded as positive such as high agreeableness may work against women who seek leadership roles.

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Emotional control is obviously important for leadership roles, but emotions are just one aspect of a good leader. Unfortunately the MAGA women could not have properly constructed an argument as to (1) why men are better leaders than women (2) why they should lead more than women. That requires a proper examination of the Biorealist sciences like evolutionary psychology and understanding of the patriarchal nature of our mammalian species, the recognition that we behave a certain way because we were programmed to behave a certain way by our genetics.

That being said, he is the best summary of the demonstrable gender differences in cognitive ability and personality taken from a large meta-analysis:

Also, it is better to imagine leadership qualities as existing on a spectrum. Some women are better at leading than most men, in-fact I’m certain that the top 1% female leaders is naturally better than the bottom 97% of men at leading, but at the same time, the median percentile of men is certainly better at leading than at least 85% of women. Moreover there are contexts in which women may be better at leading than men. But politics is definitely not an example of this, and we need to limit voting power to those who have demonstrated sufficient political knowledge.

I wish society had broadened the score distributions to things other than intelligence. Much of these debates should not be about averages, but the distribution itself. So the question is never “can women lead?”. The question is: across the full distribution, do men and women perform equally, or does one sex have a higher mean and/or lower variance in leadership-relevant traits?

Best you could find is some occasional article from questionable Ukrainian news source about which gamers have the highest IQ. In case you were wondering, here is what they have gotten:

My immediate criticism of any such list is this: if 50% of Among Us or Rainbow Six Siege players had IQs above 119, most of them would presumably be running the world. There is simply no way a mass-market game like Among Us, let alone Minecraft could cluster at a median IQ of 117 when the global average sits somewhere between 80 and 83. The math just doesn’t add up. We do not have a billion people with IQs above 117 spending their leisure time exclusively on Minecraft and Amogus.

Another article I was browsing has returned with the following estimations: my personal experience in playing Counter Strike left me with an impression that only an uncivilized goy-cattle could play anything like that. The community was toxic and there was barely any thought or strategy put into these games.

Dota 2 and League of Legends are mostly played by tech bros, dorks and other autists so this may be true, although I doubt that their average IQ is higher than 110. At any rate, none of these games featured proper strategy games to likes of Total War, Civilization, Command and Conquer, a city-simulator game, Heroes of Might and Magic or anything by Paradox. You know… the games that I actually liked.

Occasionally these lists do include strategy games but at the same time the average IQ scores they assign to players don’t map up to reality.

It was all true until today, when I stumbled across an actual

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The name Clavicular comes from clavicle which is the S-shaped bone that connects the sternum to the shoulder blade and determines, more than almost any other single skeletal feature, whether a man looks like a man. It is also, crucially, nearly impossible to significantly alter through training, drugs, or surgery. You cannot meaningfully widen your clavicles. You were born with them.

In looksmaxxing theology, the clavicle represents the outer limit of ascension, the structural constraint that defines the ceiling much like the ability of trans women to become pregnant, nearly impossible.

A man who names himself after his skeletal cage and then spends his entire adult life attempting to escape it through outside intervention is trans by default. A person in the process of transition from A to B.

The standard definition of transgenderism relies on rejecting the socially assigned binary, male or female and instead going for the idea that sex and gender exist on a spectrum. And if sex and gender operate as continuum rather than binaries, which is also the claim of trans ideologues, then transition is movement along the continuum can represent a form of transitioning, irrespective if the direction is towards greater masculinity or femininity.

Type 1 is the familiar case: crossing the binary. Male-to-female, female-to-male. Type 2 is what is called gender exaggeration: moving toward the extreme end of your existing sex or gender category. A man pursuing maximal masculinity through hormonal and surgical intervention.

This, by the way is the core thesis of a philosophy paper by Dan Demetriou who got fired from his University position for daring to publishing it.

Both are caused by body dysphoria, the distress of the person whose particular body instantiation does not match what they imagine their body should look like and so they need to transform it into a different, non-genetically determined version of themselves. That is how Braden Peters is in the process of becoming Clavicular.

Clavicular is chemically dependent on pharmaceutical sex hormones to maintain the phenotype he has chosen. His endogenous testosterone production has been suppressed. Much like regular trans people he cannot reproduce. MTF practitioners on estrogen become infertile. Clavicular, on chronic supraphysiological testosterone initiated in adolescence, has also become infertile. Both cases involve the sacrifice of reproductive function in service of a preferred bodily identity. From an evolutionary standpoint, these cases are structurally identical: the individual has permanently traded reproductive capacity for phenotypic congruence with a chosen identity.

Clavicular himself, in a moment of unusual honesty, acknowledged the parallel. “What I do is the opposite of like transgenders. So it’s like they’re like male to female, and I’d be doing like male to male.” He meant this as a dismissal. But it reads instead as an accurate self-description.

When his university confiscated his hormones, he called them “medication” which maintained his “hormonal stability.” Do you notice any parallels? This is the language of someone describing gender-affirming care. He is now dependent on it to maintain his persona, and when they’re off for a few days, just like trans women or trans-men reverting back to their biological sex, Clavicular’s muscles shrink and he starts to look like an average male.

Braden Peters and Clavicular are not the same person. Braden Peters was the kid who woke up two hours early to avoid his parents, sat in his car, counted his daily words, aimed for under fifty. He documented techniques for faking neurotypicality, mimicking the mannerisms of fictional characters, rehearsing stolen jokes, engineering every social interaction is what Judith Butler calls “performativity”.

Identity is not something you have, it is something you do: repeatedly, consistently, until the performance produces the effect of a stable self. There is no authentic inner Braden Peters waiting to be expressed. More like Braden Peters is becoming Clavicular. How is it different than a sissy slutson convinced xerself he is a woman after gooning to the idea of himself being a woman?

It’s a form of identity transformation, away from genetic, towards social construction. Away from something innate and real, into something false and demanding constant maintenance through affirmation. The mogging ritual is worth taking seriously here because it is genuinely the core sacrament of the looksmaxxing religion. As I said in my video analyzing Clavicular’s philosophy, mogging is not about attracting women, Clavicular said explicitly that getting girls has “lost its novelty.”

It is about enacting masculine superiority in front of witnesses. It is, in Butler’s terms, a performative act: something that doesn’t express a pre-existing identity but constitutes one through the act itself. The mog is not evidence that Clavicular is a Chad. The mog is how Clavicular becomes a Chad, over and over, in a process that is never finished because the identity is never secure. This is structurally identical to what trans activists call gender euphoria: the moment of performed identity that subjectively confirms, temporarily, that the transition is real.

Both require an audience. Both require repetition. Both arose out of body dysphoria. Neither is ever finally complete. And neither will ever be complete for they are built upon the rejection of their genetical code.

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I’ve also started working on a YouTube video as I’m planning to return there after not uploading there for centuries. So expect that hopefully by the end of this month or early next month]

My wife and I recently visited Scotland, and in particular Edinburgh, and I have been thinking about that visit in light of the Scottish Parliament recently voting to endorse another referendum on independence.

We stayed in an Airbnb within a stone’s throw of both the Scottish Parliament building and Holyrood, where the King stays when he is in Edinburgh. Before getting into the politics of Scottish independence, though, a few on-the-ground impressions struck us first.

The train station was very well-maintained, and the trains themselves were clean and efficient. When we arrived, it was only a couple of minutes from the station to where we were staying. The building we stayed in was over 250 years old, with a great deal of history and beautiful gardens around it. That sort of thing is hard to replicate. It gave the whole stay a feeling of being surrounded by a country with deep roots.

Even though Edinburgh is one of the more diverse cities in Scotland, and even though we were there during tourist season, it still did not feel nearly as alien as London. There was still a recognizably Scottish feel to the place. You did not feel as if the older character of the city had been completely swallowed up.

We visited Edinburgh Castle, and we also visited the home of John Knox. You see in Scotland, even in its most cosmopolitan city, the history of a practical, independent-minded people still abounds. Knox’s home is a major tourist stop, even though his practical, anti-egalitarian, yet anti-despotic theology would send most people running for the hills today. His legacy still lives on, not just in Scotland, but in America as well, where his covenantalism became constitutionalism.

That is one of the things modern people often miss about Knox and the old Scottish Reformed tradition. It was not egalitarian in the modern sense. It did not believe that all men were interchangeable atoms, or that society could be built on sentiment and slogans. But it was also not servile. It was deeply suspicious of arbitrary power. Kings were under God. Magistrates were under the law. The people were bound together in a covenant. That older Scottish instinct—stern, practical, religious, and resistant to tyranny—crossed the Atlantic and helped form the American constitutional mind.

That older Scotland is still visible in Edinburgh. It is visible in the castle. It is visible in the churches and the old streets. It is visible in the old Parliament building, which was in use before the creation of Great Britain in the early 1700s. That building, near historic churches and many other great buildings, is far more beautiful and dignified than the current Scottish Parliament building.

And that brings me to one of the sharpest contrasts of the trip.

Edinburgh Castle is beautiful. Holyrood has its own historic dignity. The old parts of the city have a grandeur that only centuries can produce. The Scottish Parliament building, by contrast, is ugly. Not just somewhat odd or modern in a tolerable way, but genuinely ugly. The locals we talked to seemed almost unanimous in thinking it was a monstrosity of hideous 1990s architecture.

The outside looks like a total wreck of a job, the kind of thing a toddler could have done better. The inside looks nothing like the grandeur of Westminster. It looks more like a municipal building than a house of parliament. The chamber where the Scottish Parliament meets is decorated like some mid-level American city council chamber. It has none of the weight or seriousness that one expects from a national legislature.

That may sound superficial, but I do not think it is. Architecture says something about a regime. Westminster looks like the seat of an old civilization, even when the politicians inside it are fools. The Scottish Parliament building looks like the product of a self-conscious modern political class trying to symbolize a new Scotland while cutting itself off from the older Scotland that actually gives the country its power and charm.

Walking around town, one was also reminded that politics is never too far away. While we were sitting in a restaurant on a Saturday afternoon, there was a pro-Gaza march going by. It was led by a mixture of obvious foreigners, as well as plenty of redheaded Scots. They waved Palestinian flags and held their signs, but altogether it was quite orderly. No violence broke out. It was political, but not chaotic.

We also saw a small demonstration that same day outside the Parliament building protesting the government’s movement away from the radical pro-trans agenda. What struck me most was how small it was. The total number of protesters could not have exceeded a hundred. Considering the size of Edinburgh and the social liberalism of much of Scotland, that was rather pathetic.

This is a cause that has been cherished by so many in the influencer and elite classes, and yet when we saw it on the ground, it could barely draw a crowd. To me, that showed something important. It suggested that the elite had largely abandoned the issue, or at least turned off the spigot of money, media attention, and institutional pressure. Once that happens, many of these causes are revealed for what they are. They are not mass movements. They are elite projects. Without elite support, the energy disappears quickly.

That is a good example of the truth of elite theory in politics. Many things that are presented as popular revolutions are really the work of institutions, donors, media, NGOs, and political actors pushing from above. When the support from above is withdrawn, the supposed mass movement shrinks down to a few activists outside a government building.

As we drove around and talked to people, we got some interesting impressions from our Uber driver, as well as from people we encountered in shops and other places in casual conversation. We heard from people who thought the Parliament building was ugly. We also heard the view that it would have been a horrible mistake to leave the UK back in 2014. There was a typical view of politicians as windbags and self-important talkers, which seemed about right.

And when you look back to the 2014 Scottish referendum, Edinburgh is especially interesting. The independence side was defeated there by roughly 61–39. If anything, I would expect the number to be even more against independence today in Edinburgh, despite the general left-liberal character of the city.

The polling now seems to show a slight edge for independence if a referendum were held today. But at the earliest, such a referendum would be a year away, and a great deal can change in a year. It is quite possible that Keir Starmer will be out as Prime Minister by then and that Andy Burnham could be the new Prime Minister, giving Labour a temporary sugar high. If that happens, Labour may be even more inclined to reject the idea of independence in Parliament, or at least more capable of rallying unionist sentiment.

That is the thing about this latest Scottish Parliament vote. It sounds dramatic, and in one sense it is politically significant. But in another sense, it is still a vote inside a devolved parliament that cannot simply create independence by wishing for it. The real question is not whether the Scottish political class wants another referendum. Many of them plainly do. The real question is whether the Scottish people, when forced to look at the practical consequences, actually want to leave the United Kingdom.

My impression from Scotland was that it is far more practical than one would think from following Scottish politics at a distance. The loudest voices are not always representative. The Scotland we encountered was not some revolutionary nation on the verge of breaking free. It was an old country, full of history, beauty, and local pride, but also full of people who know politicians are often fools and promises are often cheap.

There is certainly an independent-minded spirit in Scotland. You can see it everywhere. You can see it in the memory of Knox, in the old covenantal instincts, in the castle, in the older Parliament, and in the general suspicion of being ruled too directly by distant powers. But that same spirit is also practical. It does not automatically translate into support for the modern SNP vision of independence, especially when that vision is tied to progressive managerial politics, ugly modern architecture, and the same elite obsessions that have disfigured much of the West.

In that sense, Scotland is complicated. It is old and modern, nationalist and practical, left-wing in many of its institutions but still visibly rooted in an older and sterner world. The Scottish Parliament may vote for another referendum, and the polling may move back and forth, but the real Scotland is not reducible to parliamentary motions or activist slogans.

What struck me most was that Scotland still feels like a real place. Edinburgh, for all its tourists and diversity, still felt Scottish. Its past was not hidden. Its history was not dead. Its older religious and political instincts were still there, even if many modern Scots would not describe them in those terms.

And that is why I came away thinking that the independence question is not as simple as outsiders might imagine. Scotland has every reason to remember that it is a nation. But it also has every reason to distrust the class of people currently claiming to speak in the name of nationhood.

The Scotland I saw was beautiful, historic, orderly, skeptical, and much more practical than its political rhetoric suggests. That practical streak may end up mattering more than any vote in Holyrood.

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That being said, for a highly-antisemitic person lik…

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There is a specific human type that never quite gets the scrutiny it deserves. Unlike the antisemite, who has been dissected with forensic obsession since 1945, the philosemite is also has been almost under no scrutiny despite being of the opposite end of the JQ obsession.

Now, I want to be precise here. I am not describing people who simply have Jewish friends, admire Jewish contributions to civilization, or support Israel’s right to exist as a geopolitical position. I am describing a distinct psychological type of people: the non-Jew for whom Jews have become a collective deity that must be worshipped and obeyed. The person whose identity, politics, and moral framework cannot be fully understood without reference to what they think about Jews.

Given that is what people on the far-right and far-left of the political spectrum are reduced too, it is only fair that we scrutinize the psychological profile of people who love Jews more than themselves.

I will start with the “least worst” type before I move into the absolute depths of hell:

The Goy

Level one. The bottom of the hierarchy.

The Goy, as I am using the term here, is not defined by active hostility or active sympathy. He is defined by intellectual vacancy combined with a default political position absorbed from the environment.

This type is typically old and grew up on watching television and has the exact same moral code as Jerry Seinfeld.

He supports Israel not because he has thought about it, or not because he was paid to do it, but because he was raised on Hollywood, which has for decades produced a particular narrative architecture around Jewish identity, World War II, and Israeli statehood. He absorbed it the way a child absorbs anything in the ambient environment: completely and uncritically.

Unlike the Zionist Influencer, he cannot make content about this. He lacks the verbal fluency. This is the type of person that would type “I stand with Israel” in comment section without being able to answer why.

The Goy is despised equally by Jews and antisemites alike. He belongs entirely to neither camp and serves no one’s interests well, including his own. In a different social structure he would be an antisemite, a communist or someone else because at its core the Goy has no personhood. A useful idiot

is what he is.

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View this as purely a quantitative endeavor with no commentary. Perhaps I will eventually turn this into a bigger post or a YouTube video with my own commentary and conclusions, but right now I am simply documenting the research without any qualitative input.

The Army

I immediately set out to verify these claims, beginning with the military aspect. If Grand Dukes are counted as German, then during World War I, Germans comprised a striking 38% of the Russian Empire’s top generals. Vindicated?

Here is how many Russian generals were of German descent in different periods of Russian history according to Claude:

Napoleonic era (1800-1820)~25-30% of generals

Nicholas I era (1825-1855)~20-25% of generals

Alexander II era (1855-1881)~15-20% of generals

Alexander III era (1881-1894)~10-15% of generals

Nicholas II pre-war (1894-1914)~8-12% of generals

Then I have decided to dig further and study Russia’s Civil War generals and here is their ethnic backgrounds:

White Army:

Anton Denikin — Russian

Alexander Kolchak — Russian + Moldovan/Turkic

Pyotr Wrangel — Baltic German

Lavr Kornilov — Russian + Asian

Nikolai Yudenich — Russian

Sergey Markov — Russian

Anatoly Pepelyayev — Russian

Roman von Ungern-Sternberg — Baltic German

Pyotr Krasnov — Russian, Cossack

Mikhail Alekseyev — Russian

Yevgeny Miller — Baltic German

Germans = 27% of the main White Army forces generals if you include Roman von Ungern-Sternberg as a White army general, 18% if you don’t.

Red Army:

Leon Trotsky — Jewish

Sergey Kamenev — Russian

Mikhail Tukhachevsky — Russian

Semyon Budyonny — Ukrainian/Russian Cossack (Don region)

Vasily Chapayev — Russian

Ion Yakir — Jewish

Ieronim Uborevich — Lithuanian (possible of Belarussian descent)

Jukums Vācietis — Latvian

Alexander Yegorov — Russian

Kliment Voroshilov — Russian

Mikhail Frunze — Moldovan + Russian

Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko — Ukrainian

Pavel Dybenko — Ukrainian

Zero prominent Germans among famous Red Generals.

Then I decided to improve my methodology and instead of going based on famous ones I have decided to take a look at all of them combined using this database:

Using Claude for my counting I got the following results:

Here is how Red and White sides compare:

Red Side:

White Side:

These lists didn’t add up to my own calculation and so I decided to look into the labeling and as predicted it counts many Germans as Russians because they were culturally assimilated.

Still, the amount of Germans even if you include those with 1/4 German grandparents is 9% of the total. Consistent with Claude estimates of later Russian army being around 9% German.

The Government

Then I decided to look into the government, how many ministerial positions were occupied by Germans. For my methodology I decided to look at those who occupied the last ministerial position for any sphere:

Nikolai Golitsyn - Chairman of Council of Ministers - Russian

Alexander Protopopov - Minister of Interior - Russian

Pyotr Bark - Minister of Finance - Half German, half Russian

Eduard Krieger-VoinovskyMinister of Railways - German, some Polish ancestry

Nikolai Pokrovsky - Minister of Foreign Affairs - Russian

Nikolai Dobrovolsky - Minister of Justice - Russian

Mikhail Belyayev - Minister of War - Russian

Nikolai Kulchitsky - Minister of Education - Russian of Ukrainian descent

Vladimir Fredericks - Minister of Imperial Court - Baltic German

Ivan Grigorovich - Minister of the Navy - Russian

Vsevolod Shakhovsky - Minister of Trade and Industry - Russian

Alexander Rittikh - Minister of Agriculture - Half German, half Russian

Georgy Ermolaevich Rein of Public Health - German surname, little info on family

Sergei Feodosyev - State Comptroller - Russian

Nikolai Rayev - Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod - Russian

Pavel Stakhovich - Head of State Stud Farms - Russian

Out of 16 ministers 5 were of German descent, though most of them were of partial German descent. If you break it down in terms of genetics, it will appear that indeed 20% of Russia’s ministers having German DNA.

In my previous article I have estimated that people with German ancestry were in charge of the Russian government about 10% of the time.

Diplomacy

The next claim is the German overrepresentation among the Russian diplomats (which I have noticed myself)

Let’s start with the heads of the Russia’s foreign ministers:

Alexander Vorontsov 1802-1804 Russian

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1804-1806 Polish

Andreas Eberhard von Budberg 1806-1807 Baltic German

Nikolay Rumyantsev 1808-1814 Russian

Ioannis Kapodistrias 1816-1822 Greek

Karl Nesselrode 1814-1856 Baltic German

Alexander Gorchakov 1856-1882 Russian

Nicholas de Giers 1882-1895 1/2 Swedish 1/2 German

Alexei Lobanov-Rostovsky 1895-1896 Russian

Nikolay Shishkin 1896-1897 Russian

Mikhail Muravyov 1897-1900 Russian

Vladimir Lamsdorf 1901-1906 Baltic German

Alexander Izvolsky 1906-1910 Russian

Sergei Sazonov 1910-1916 Russian

Boris Sturmer 1916 1/2 German 1/2 Russian

Nikolay Pokrovsky 1916-1917 Russian

Out of 16 ministers 5 were of German descent and 3 were of full German descent. Funny enough if we look at the later stage of the Russian Empire it was noticeably less German. Genetically that’s about 25% Germanic.

For ambassadors I have decided to look at the last Russian ambassadors in major countries before the 1917 revolution:

British Empire (Chargé d'affaires) - Konstantin Nabokov - Russian

British Empire (Ambassador) - Sergey Sazonov - Russian

France - Vasily Maklakov - Russian

Italy - Mikhail von Giers - 1/2 Moldovan (possibly some German there) 1/4 Swedish 1/4 German

Spain - Mikhail Stakhovich - Russian

United States - George Bakhmeteff - Tatar (Christian)

Japan - Vasily Krupensky - Russian

Portugal - Pyotr Polikarpov - Russian

Switzerland - Ivan Efremov - Russian

Belgium - Alexander Nelidov - Russian

Netherlands - Nikolai Swerbeyev - Russian

Greece - Elim Demidov - Russian, symbolic Finno-Ugric descent

Serbia - Grigory Trubetskoy - Russian

Romania - Stanislav Poklevsky-Kozell - Polish

Sweden - Anatoly Neklyudov - Russian

Norway - Konstantin Gulkevich - Russian

Denmark - Matvey Sevastopulo - Greek

Argentina - Eugene Stein - Jewish

Persia - Nikolai von Etter - German

China - Nikolai Kudashev - Russian

Germans made only 6.25% of the total. That being said, I did a visual inspection of Russian ambassadors to these various countries and there was a lot of German overrepresentation to major countries like the UK, France and the United States in the middle of 19th century. Perhaps up to a third of all Russian ambassadors in major countries were of German descent, however in the early 20th century their influence has sharply fallen.

If you include the last Russian ambassadors to the Central Powers (1914) then here they are:

German Empire - Sergey Sverbeyev - Russian - (1912-1914)

Ottoman Empire - Mikhail von Giers - 1/2 Moldovan (possibly some German there) 1/4 Swedish 1/4 German - (1912-1914)

Bulgaria - Aleksandr Savinsky - Russian - (1913-1915)

Austria-Hungary - Nikolay Nikolayevich Shebeko - Russian - (1913-1914)

As you can see nothing really changes.

To test out my theory I decided to employ Claude to look at all Russian ambassadors to major countries in the 19th century (Italy, France, British Empire, United States, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire), here are the results:

Germans = 27% of the total. Here is how this breakdown looks like by each country:

Austria-Hungary: Germans: 4 out of 16 = 25%

Germany: Germans: 4 out of 12 = 33%

United States: Germans: 5 out of 13 = 38%

Italy: Germans: 1 out of 5 = 20%

France: Germans: 2 out of 9 = 22%

British Empire: Germans: 5 out of 10 = 50%

Ottoman Empire: Germans: 0 out of 15 = 0%

Administration:

Finally, let’s look at the administration. After excluding Poland, Baltics and Finland here is who governed the provinces of the Russian Empire for 1914:

As you can see the German input is tremendous and like many other things you’re about to see. The only correction I’d make is add more Russian Cossacks like the governor of Kuban Oblast. Anyways, there is basically no other ethnic representation besides the Russian and the Germans as it relates to governing provinces. As I wrote on Twitter:

If you examine gubernatorial appointments in the Russian Empire, it becomes clear that the Russian Empire could be described as Great Russian and German supremacist state. Only Georgians and to a lesser extent Armenians managed to attain some positions within this hierarchy.

Germans made 24% of the total governors of the Russian Empire, although, much of it was concentrated in the Baltics, Central Asia, Finland and Vistula. The European part of Russia in which the Germans reigned over was mostly territories of the Ukraine and Belarus.

Nonetheless, the Russians and the Germans have effectively co-ran the Russian Empire’s administrative borders at the exclusion of everybody else with some minor caveats.

Parliament (State Duma):

Thankfully there is a research article on this topic already so I don’t need to do extra research myself.

All the people of Russia acquired the right to present their
interests during the elections and in the Duma, to form nationally-based
political elites and to master parliamentary political culture.
However, only four deputies of the First State Duma were registered
as Germans. They all represented immigrant communities: Andreas
Widmer, a Lutheran farmer, deputy of a district zemstvo (local government)
assembly in Bessarabia province; Ivan Minkh, the Lutheran headman of a
German colony in Kherson province; another Lutheran, Jacob Dietz, a
lawyer and journalist from Saratov province; and Heinrich Schelhorn, a
parish foreman, owner of a printing house and deputy of the provincial and
district zemstvo assembly of Samara province.

In other words, out of 477 deputies, Germans amounted to just 4 or 0.84% of the total. This means that Germans were actually underrepresented in the one institution selected by something resembling a democratic franchise.

Anyways, I did some extra digging myself and found a list of all the deputies in the Russian Empire’s State Duma. Looking into the Fourth State Duma (1912-1917) specifically, here are the results:

As you can see, the Russian parliament was a Russian-dominated space. Germans amounted to just 2% of the total and overwhelmingly belonged to the Czarist Octobrist party.

Finally I decided to go with the 1917 Russian Constituent Assembly election after the Czarist regime lost power and here are the results of the first Russian election with universal suffrage:

As you can see both the Germans and the Russians took a heavy hit from the universal suffrage. But the Germans were completely wiped out.

I also challenged Claude on the Jewishness of the Bolsheviks and this is the results:

Cultural and Spiritual Life

German Writers

Thankfully I don’t need to conduct new research because I have already done an ethnic and religious study of the greatest Russian writers of all time and by Russian I mean writers from the Russian Empire and as I have determined Germans were not represented at the early stages of the Russian Empire yet they were not particularly overrepresented at the later stages of the Russian Empire either. For the most part, German overrepresentation means that one or two Russian writers were one eight or one quarter German themselves. Nonetheless here is the data:

German DNA made about 5.88% of Russian writers and poets of the Golden Age Era and 3.5% of the Silver Age Era. However the Russian Empire did not produce a single well known German writer.

Classical Music:

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In this article, I won’t be talking about how the Russians are killing way less civilians than the Americans or how the Americans are fighting the war way more effectively, while suffering minimal manpower losses. This is all common sense, and if I wanted to make an emphasis on that, then I’d not differ from any other commentators.

Instead, I want to emphasize the psychological aspect of Russian and American decision making in regards to war, and with regards to other aspects of the decision making chain. A difference in mentality between Russians and the Americans or Westerners more broadly.

That is, the American society is able to reflex and course correct whereas the Russian is not and I will show how this is both a strength and a weakness.

The Russian Approach To War

Russia’s fundamental characteristic as a strategic actor is its capacity for endurance and psychological rigidity. It is a national characteristic of the Russian state. The Russian society, shaped by centuries of catastrophic wars, famine, and poor living standards has developed a tolerance for collective suffering that Westerners did not.

The Ukrainian population, likewise, heir to the same historical dynamics, has demonstrated the same quality. Both peoples have absorbed casualty rates and material deprivation that would have produced existential political crises in any Western democracy within months and as we know by the Iranian campaign even within weeks.

The Russian rulers have also developed a very rigid approach to governing their own population, manifested by severe state violence, repression of the opposition and appearing strong which all predisposes them against course correction and for sticking with the strategy that they have adopted no matter what. In the maximalist sense it implies that the entire Russian political and social structure is built on the fiction of infallibility from above and once the ruler had made a decision, the entire country must stick to it or face punishment.

These two factors make course correction nearly impossible. The Russian system lacks feedback loops that function in a similar fashion that it does in the Western states because the Russian regime sees their own population as a potential threat to power, but as a result of that they are able to make unpopular decisions and stick to them.

Perhaps it is my post-hoc rationality, but speaking purely in terms of state aggregation and not in terms of the economy, demographics (debatable) or international law fighting a long war of endurance has probably paid off. It is certain that had Russia peaced out in 2022 and not in 2026 or next year, its gains would have been smaller than they are now. Likewise, the maximalist Russian aims of 2022 did not include land annexations but they did include an unsustainable regime change done in a country which clearly doesn’t want it.

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More than two weeks into this military adventure, we know that Trump has failed in two of his main objectives:

1. Achieving a swift victory and signing peace on terms favorable to Israel and the United States

2. Achieving regime change

In this article, I will not be providing a summary of the military engagement or how each side is faring, I’ll save that for a YouTube video hopefully coming out within a week (as promised). Instead, I want to talk about the psychology of conflict. What makes someone resist, and what makes someone fold? Because as it turns out, you can face an enemy a hundred times your strength and still resist despite taking heavy losses. And I’m not talking about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the American invasion of Vietnam, I’m talking about Gaza. What motivates these people to continue fighting, despite enduring a genocide and total destruction of civilian infrastructure on a scale not seen since the Second World War?

A common understanding of politics includes assumption of rationality among people, particularly the calculation of a cost-benefit analysis without factoring in the emotions, commitment and motivations to fight. Because as it turns out you could launch a war you know you’d lose and suffer devastating consequences at the end, but do it regardless.

You could also defend against an enemy much stronger than you, refuse to make concessions even though on an intuitive level you know you stand no chances in the long run.

The Iranian war situation is one among many in which a weaker country is choosing to resist a much stronger and powerful one (two), doing so asymmetrically, escalating despite having weaker cards, and preparing for a long war of attrition that will cost the Americans dearly.

So the question is, why did Venezuela capitulate, while Ukraine, Hamas and Iran have decided to resist? What is it about the psychology and mental calculations of countries like Iran that are different than countries like Venezuela? At the end of the day, Iran got bombed much harder than Venezuela and its Shia regime was hugely unpopular, whereas Venezuela could have also shown some resistance against the Americans, perhaps dragging the war for multiple months, but they have chose not to do that and become US puppets instead (while keeping the regime).

The Psychology of War

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My main thesis is that Trump and not necessarily the United States is going to lose this war due to a series of economic, political and reputational casualties that he’s going to suffer.

But before I go over it, I also would like to make it very clear that the economic and humanitarian damages that Iran is going to suffer will be much greater in volume. That is obvious, but at the same time, the tolerance for pain and suffering there is much higher than it is in the United States, especially when they are necessary for their own survival.

Special Military Operation gone wrong

It does appear that the initial objective was to try to achieve a Venezuela style coup, to decapitate the Iranian leadership and then have Masoud Pezeshkian or some other moderate take the position of power and re-negotiate from a weaker position.

I don’t know for sure if this was the plan, but circumstantial evidence of the most amount of strikes occurring in the first few days of the war, sparing of Pazeshkian, Venezuela experience and appearing discomforted when the Iranian regime didn’t fell makes me conclude it was their plan A.

Plan B as we now learn is a prolonged war, done for the purposes of completely degrading Iranian military and “nuclear” capabilities and also likely attacking civilian infrastructure like they already have.

Evidence that we’re operating on plan B came up in early March, when US officials admitted that the operation may drag until September and may involve deploying US troops on the ground, using the Kurds as expandable meat or continuing to bomb Iran into oblivion without a ground invasion.

If the goal is regime change, you need to deploy the troops, if it’s about destroying Iranian military capacity, you can get away with it without the troops, but there is no evidence that the Iranians are willing to capitulate when they’re offered the US taking their oil, like with Venezuela for peace.

Charlie Kirk predicted what Iran’s response will be after the US took out its leadership and killed many of its civilians. Just as he said, Iran attacked every US ally in the middle east and caused as much chaos as possible, despite huge humanitarian costs to themselves.

Iran has upped their game to a significant degree, not just by blocking the strait of Hormuz, causing the oil prices to rise above 100 dollars a barrel, but also by attacking oil, military and economic objectives in the Gulf states for which the United States was clearly not prepared.

The United States and Israel have likewise promised death and destruction for the Iranians and are now exploring the possibilities of using Kurdish separatists to destroy the country. Most crucially, Donald Trump has refused to give legitimacy to Reza Pahlavi, the leader of the Iranian opposition and the self-proclaimed King, which is to say that Trump doesn’t know exactly what he’s doing but he certainly is trying to up the game.

And when you up your game, it is hard to de-escalate especially when you are facing an existential war like Iran does right now. This is to say that there are no real incentives for the Iranian regime to de-escalate or sign a peace treaty with the United States. First they can’t trust the United States and Israel, second the United States and Israel kill their leaders, they killed civilians and finally there doesn’t appear to be any non-humiliating peace agreements for Iran.

And so when you combine this with the inability to destroy the Iranian regime militarily without a costly ground invasion you are left with a “forever war” and a forever war is going to be economically, politically and reputationally costly.

The Economic Cost of the War

The direct cost of the war is probably not as big for the American budget. 9 days of war costed up to 5 billion dollars which is not especially expensive, but it’s not cheap either. If we assume the war will go on for another year and its cost will remain constant it’s an expense of 200 billion US dollars or about as much as the US aid to Ukraine and Israel combined since 2022.

But if the United States decides to do a ground invasion and suffers casualties in the process, the cost will likely be worse than the Iraq war.

But right now that’s not even the most important part, the direct costs now are economical, oil and gas prices have increased by over 40% since the war started and they will remain high for as long as Iran is able to sink ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz which may be for months.

We also don’t know what’s the cap price for oil and WSJ predicts the price could be as high as 200 dollars a barrel. Besides the price of gas increasing, this can unleash a chain of unintended consequences and cause an economic collapse on a scale of 2008 if not worse. And this economic crisis will be much worse than whatever the US might have spent for a ground invasion in Iran.

Likewise, the more the Gulf States are getting bombed, the less likely they are to invest in US businesses, but that’s just a side note.

Reputational Costs

Besides proving once again that the international rule of law does not exist and Israel with the United States can do whatever they want, these actions undermine the confidence of key US allies in the middle east. Why would Qatar or UAE want to do business with the United States or provide territory for US bases if that will come at a cost to their own nation’s wealth and prestige because most importantly, the United States is not able to protect them as well as it is able to protect Israel.

This is essentially going to be the crux of my argument, Trump and Rubio have exposed to the world how business is done in America. Israel is in the driving seat, Trump’s administration merely responds to the decisions already made in Tel-Aviv.

This might be fine if you’re Jewish or indifferent to maintaining an American empire, but it also signals to other US allies that the surest way to secure good relations with Washington is to win Israel’s approval first.

Some countries like Turkiye (a NATO state) won’t be able to do that and so eventually the United States will begin losing allies in best case scenario or in the worse case scenario attack them jointly with Israel.

Qatar was already attacked by Israel and the United States couldn’t do nothing to stop the Israelis.

If you’re an Arab state or any state anywhere in the world and seeing this, you either pull an Argentina, and join the United States in serving Israel or you decide you want nothing to do with any of it.

Trump has already called NATO countries for help, but it seems to be ignored thus far because they understand how ridiculous all of this is.

Political Costs

Finally the most important part of it is going to be the political cost of this adventure.

What sets this war apart from other wars the US engaged in, namely the Iraq war and the Afghanistan war is that this war has a major partisan divide. The Republicans are supportive of the war whereas the Democrats are not.

But, we all know that public opinion doesn’t matter as much as official opinion. True, but here the situation for Republicans is even worse:

While the previous two wars enjoyed a broad legal consensus in both the house and the senate, what sets this war apart from other ones, besides launching it without congress approval is the fact that almost all Democrats have voted against it.

That is to say, this is a war of Trump, the Republican Party and the Jewish oligarchs against the American and Iranian people who are currently represented by the Democratic Party.

And guess what, the Democrats want to impeach Trump, they failed before, but right now given how unpopular the war is already, and given that there will be even more US casualties in the war, especially with the event of a ground invasion, the Democrats will likely sweep the government and do what they’ve always wanted and it will be perfectly legal because Trump bypassed the Congress when he “decided” to Iran.

The mechanism works as follows:

1. The war pisses off a lot of people ← already passed that stage

2. Midterms defeat

3. Impeachment

Even if Trump does “win” the war somehow, a lot of people will still get pissed, vote for the Democrats and if they control both the House and the Senate, they will impeach his ass out of office.

It’s a lose-lose scenario for Trump. If the Democrats get both the house and the senate and the probability that they will is very high and even if they don’t there are at least two Republican congressmen who will vote for impeaching Trump.

What’s certain is that right before the war Trump had about 40% approval rating and it appears that he lost a few points since the war began. But that is just the beginning, the more war drags (and it will, unless Trump cucksout) the worse will be the chances of the Republicans not to lose both the House and the Senate.

More US casualties, increased inflation and gas prices are going to finish the Republicans off in the midterms. And notice, that will do the damage just enough without suffering a major military defeat like losing a couple of ships, or not being able to advance beyond 200 kilometers into Iran.

But now imagine, if the US does suffer a major military defeat (which is not unlikely if there will be a ground invasion), then there will be a complete blue wave like we’ve never seen before.

What’s important to remember about this war, is that most Americans don’t see it as an American-Iranian war. They see it as a war of choice of Trump and the Israelis. There is not going to be a rallying around the flag effect like happened in Iran whose regime they want to topple. So the Republican Party is going to be attacked from every direction, from the far-right, America First, independents, non-aligned, liberals and leftists and these attacks are going to sway the public opinion into the direction even more unfavorable than is now the case.

At the same time, Trump could pull-out from the war at any moment, like he did with the Houthis, but that of course, assumes the United States is a sovereign nation. Latest news confirm that ending the war will have to be a mutual Israeli-American decision and there is no evidence that the Israelis want peace. Ending the war will be highly unpopular in Israel with just 4.5% of Israeli Jews opposing the war.

Likewise, at home the situation isn’t much better. Jews are the only ethnic group in the United States to be overwhelmingly supportive of the Iran war and so there will be a lot of pressure from the Jewish oligarchs and AIPAC to continue waging it, irrespective of economic, political and reputational losses that the United States will suffer.

That is why I am confident that the Trump regime, but not the United States are going to lose this war irrespective of what happens on the battlefield, though I am also quite confident that the Americans are not going to conquer Iran before the midterms.

Pulling from the war would require damaging relations for Israel and I don’t think Trump possesses enough political capital to do this. Best he could do is to bomb Iran for another month and hope they eventually peace out, but I’m not sure how viable this is. Certainly not when Trump is demanding a total surrender and is bombing their schools. For a peace to be made, it must also appeal to Iranians.

If Gaza went through a genocide and Hamas is still around, there is a case to be made that the Iranians will not capitulate either. If Trump and the Israelis go nuclear or attempt to pull a Gaza 2.0, then Trump’s regime may be put on trial for war crimes by the United States government headed by the Democrats and if Trump attempts to institute a dictatorship in an attempt to save his ass that will be “it” for the United States democracy. Arguably the worst imaginable result that will send waves of chaos all across the globe.

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Introduction

The dominant paradigm in evolutionary biology since the middle of the XXth century has been what we might call the gene centric view of evolution. This paradigm, consolidated in the Modern Synthesis and further radicalized by the Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene metaphor holds that evolution is fundamentally a matter of changes in allele frequencies within populations, primarily through the process of individual selection of the genes. The organism, in this framework, is reduced to a temporary, disposable vessel constructed by genes for the sole purpose of replicating themselves selfishly.

The result is a theory that can describe changes in gene frequencies with impressive precision. It can adequately demonstrate that most of the differences between populations are genetic in origin and are thus not malleable, which is why it’s been an effective tool for right wing and Biorealist argumentation.

However this approach is ultimately a status quo approach, it tells a story of how things are at a given moment but cannot adequately explain the most striking features of evolutionary history: the emergence of novel forms, the progressive complexification of organizational architecture, the creative capacity of development to generate adaptive innovations, and most critically for our purposes the active role that organisms play in constructing, modifying, and directing the very selective environments in which they and their descendants will live or die.

As my Right-Wing Progressivism Manifesto establishes, progress involves successive changes to an organization such that it increasingly surpasses and dominates its environment. It naturally highlights the thesis that the organization is what drives evolution, both within itself and outside of itself.

Back to Darwinism

Darwin himself was an active naturalist who thought primarily in terms of whole organisms: their behavior, their structures, their relationships to conditions of existence. The organisms he observed were active agents, struggling, competing, cooperating, migrating, choosing habitats, building structures, modifying their environments. For Darwin, evolution was fundamentally about what organisms do and how what they do affects their chances of surviving and reproducing. Darwin did not know of the existence of genes and with or without them could explain the process of evolution just fine.

The Modern Synthesis, by contrast, views evolution as a process occurring in the abstract space of gene frequencies. The organism which is actually in charge of actually making selection became irrelevant to the evolutionary process. Selection and populational differences declared to be a product of random gene mutations, as opposed to the rational and sometimes irrational selective choices of the organisms.

If that were true we would certainly expect all traits to be 100% heritable and the genotype to be totally dominating the phenotype, given that humans are simply carriers of their genes, being devoid of agency.

Furthermore, random mutation is undirected by definition. It does not favor functional outcomes over nonfunctional ones. If random mutation were true we would not see continues vertical progress accompanying the process of further optimization of populations at multiple levels of selection. In a case of random mutations, we would not see such a stable and significant differences between and within populations that emerged out of the original differentiation. The creative work must be happening somewhere other than the mutation event itself.

The assertion that the genotype is the ultimate driver of evolution is contradicted by the public fact that DNA has evolved out of RNA which then evolved out of an organism that replicated and changed itself without using genes. That is to say the genotype is the result of the phenotypic evolution by default.

Many of these old unicellular forms are present within ourselves and function independently of DNA, as Stuart Newman has demonstrated, cellular pattern formation, mediated by released morphogens interacting with biochemically responsive and excitable tissues, draws on inherent self-organizing processes in proto-metazoans to transform clusters of cells into animal embryos and organs.

In other words, organism development is not the execution of a genetic program but a constructive, context-sensitive, self-organizing process in which the organism actively builds itself in dialogue with its circumstances. Genetic evolution, while facilitating innovation, serves a consolidating role rather than a generative one, capturing and routinizing morphological templates that originated in the self-organizing dynamics of the organizational development. Genes do not create organization; organization recruits and deploys genes.

Phenotype As The Driver of Evolution

Right after I published my Right Wing Progressive manifesto, I stumbled upon a book that confirmed much of my critiques of modern evolutionary science at the time when I did not possess the proper scientific language required for expressing them.

The book is called Developmental Plasticity and Evolution and its written by Mary Jane West-Eberhard and her thesis is that evolution typically begins not with genetic mutation but with environmentally initiated phenotypic change. Gene frequency change follows, as a response to the developmental change.

Consider the examples of Waddington’s flies and Ivan Schmalhausen’s stabilization:

Conrad Waddington exposed fly embryos to extreme ether stress, producing some individuals with two thoraxes. After repeated selection of bithorax individuals in progressively less severe conditions, he bred a lineage that produced the unusual structure with no ether shock at all. An environmentally induced phenotype had become genetically encoded. Not because new mutations arose, but because existing genetic variation was selected to lower the threshold for a developmental response that plasticity had already made possible.

Ivan Schmalhausen, working independently in the Soviet Union, arrived at the same mechanism from a different angle. He called it autonomization: the process by which a plastic, environmentally contingent phenotype becomes progressively independent of its environmental trigger through what he termed stabilizing selection.

Both researchers, from opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, converged on the same insight: development is not a passive readout of genetic instructions. It is a creative, self-regulating process, and the novelties it produces can become genetically entrenched after the fact.

Like everything else, it also works with humans. About 10 years ago a study found that the children of Holocaust survivors have inherited/or permanently activated a stress related gene that was not present before.

In modern science this phenomenon is referred to as epigenetics or how one’s behaviors and environment can cause changes that affect the way one’s genes work. It does not make claims that the phenotype changes the genotype in a Lamarckian fashion, but that the phenotype and the genotype exist in parallel with the organism.

The genes may randomly recombine as many times as they’d like, but their activation and rearrangement (as well as future recombination) is at the hands of the phenotype.

Mary Jane West-Eberhard introduces two concepts that clarify how phenotypic change can lead evolution. The first is phenotypic accommodation: the immediate adaptive adjustment of the phenotype to a novel trait or trait combination. When a developmental novelty arises—through mutation, environmental perturbation, or recombination of existing resources—the rest of the organism adjusts in response. Bones remodel under new mechanical demands, muscles adapt to altered skeletal structures, and neural systems reorganize to support new functions.

This capacity is not peripheral but foundational to evolvability. Without it, most novelties would be lethal, as other systems could not integrate the change and if each system required its own independent genetic mutations to achieve this coordination, adaptive evolution of complex entities would be practically impossible. This is the organizational action of the phenotype.

The second concept is genetic accommodation: the process by which initially environmentally contingent phenotypes become genetically stabilized. A phenotypic response that is initially triggered by environmental conditions can, over generations, become increasingly reliable, canalized, and eventually independent of the original environmental trigger. In this process, existing genetic variation is selected to modify the threshold, timing, or form of the developmental response, but the phenotypic novelty itself—the innovation—originated in the plastic developmental response, not in a genetic mutation.

If I were to make a highly educated guess (that is foundational to my theory) eventually this becomes the default way a gene is read, that is to say, epigenetics stabilize and simply turns into genetics. Here is a small worded diagram:

Environment → Phenotype → Epigenetics → Genotype Change.

TLDR: She correctly pointed out that genes are more like followers than leaders in evolutionary change. The phenotype IS the driver of evolution but it still treats the organism primarily as a developmental system responding to perturbations, whether genetic or environmental.

She believes that the environment is the main driver of these changes. Yet I view the environment as simply a powerful incentive machine, the main driver of the change is the organization itself which exists in a symbiotic (or as I write synotic) relationship with the environment. In a progressive understanding of this phenomenon, the organization creates the environment around itself through niche construction (more on that later) and ultimately overcomes it at the end. So, if I were to redo the diagram, here is how it would look like (it is non-linear as you can see and goes back to where it started just at the higher level of itself with each iteration, but the crucial aspect is the fact that genetic memory and coding systems have evolved from the phenotype):

Abiogenesis/Environment → The Phenotype → RNA-life form → DNA-life form → Environment →

[The AI butchered the diagram. Abiogenesis relates to the original source of life and should be cut from the diagram.]

In an alternative form:

Environment → Phenotype → Genotype → Phenotype → Environment→

The process by which an organism is overcoming the environment, as I write in my manifesto is through vertical selection, or innovation of a new organizational mode that increases the relative agility of the organism in relation to the environment. It is in that state, that the organization becomes the driver of progress, it produced an innovation which elevated itself above the environment and then than follows by a horizontal progress, or the assimilation of the innovation (or its counter) across the environment.

That is to say the phenotype is not simply in the driver’s seat of its own development in relation to the environment - it is in the driver’s seat of its own selective environment. What is missing from Mary is the full recognition that the organism is not merely a responsive system but an active agent: an organization that does not simply accommodate to environmental change but actively constructs, modifies, and directs the environmental conditions under which it and its descendants will be selected.

This is the crucial insight that transforms West-Eberhard’s developmental plasticity framework into a fully agent-centered theory of evolution—and it is this agent-centered theory that provides the biological foundations for the Right-Wing Progressive understanding of organization, evolution, progress, and selection.

Progressive Evolution

As Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee, and Marcus Feldman have demonstrated in their work on niche construction, organisms do not merely adapt to environments; they in part also construct them. Organisms regularly choose their own habitats, mates, friend circle, construct important components of their local environments such as nests, holes, hierarchies or the internet. Through these activities, organisms modify the natural selection pressures to which they and their descendants are exposed.

When organisms modify their environments in consistent ways across generations, because each individual inherits the same genes causing it to do so, or because each individual learns the same behaviors from conspecifics—these environmental modifications become a persistent source of selection.

The phenotypes that most effectively organize their own development, that most creatively modify their environments, that most successfully construct niches for themselves and their descendants - these are the phenotypes that prevail in the evolutionary contest. Furthermore, those who construct niches, which successfully attract other agents become leaders of that particular niche.

While universal in the animal world, it reaches its most extreme expression in humans. Culture is a form of niche construction and it is operating faster than genetic selection, and capable of reshaping the biological selective environment on a civilizational scale. At the human level, the organism that is subject to natural selection becomes an organism capable of exercising rational selection which in turn speeds up the evolution much faster.

The culturally inherited traditions of pastoralism have altered the selective environments of some human populations for sufficient generations to select for genes that today confer greater adult lactose tolerance. Race realists like to bring up the sickle-cell anemia argument, and more profound readers of modern sociobiology books like to make the case that institutions, norms, laws, and cultural practices of a civilization represent the accumulated ecological inheritance of generations of human niche construction. And just as the quality of ecological inheritance affects the selective pressures acting on future generations of organisms, the quality of civilizational inheritance affects the selective pressures acting on future generations of citizens.

Progressive evolution creates a positive feedback loop in which the evolution of agency and the evolution of the environment drive each other to ever-higher levels of organizational complexity and for as long as this was the case in our society right now I wouldn’t have bothered creating an ideology explaining how we have organizationally backtracked from the early and mid XXth century.

Here is the basic loop of how it works:

Organism behavior modifies local environment → Modified environment alters selection pressures → Altered pressures favor traits that fit the new environment → Those traits spread through population → Population with new traits modifies environment further.

Think of a simple phenomenon like the looksmaxxers community and how it has its own behavioral norms, specific coded language and how much cultural pressure it exerts upon the rest of the internet. It is a story of how a niche grew so powerful that it proceeded to modify the environment beyond that niche.

But at any rate, the agent proceeds niche construction because niche construction itself is the work of the agents engaging in specialization. The agent is constructing a specific niche among many primarily due to his own organizational will, because doing one thing over another is a phenomenon of selection.

The agent does not merely adapt to its environment; it progressively masters its environment, and in mastering its environment, it evolves the very capacities that enable further mastery. The phenotype gets into the driver’s seat not by a single revolutionary act but through a progressive ratcheting of agency and environmental modification that, over evolutionary time, transforms the relationship between organism and environment from one of passive submission to one of active direction.

The final manifestation of this organizational will to power is the practice of eugenics, or the rational/artificial selection of the genotype by the phenotype.

It differs from previous modes of selection by its conscious awareness of what it’s doing. Eugenics whether practiced traditionally through mate selection or whether practiced now through embryo selection for specific traits represents the dominion of the phenotype over the genotype. It gives the phenotype the proper tools and power to properly design the generic makeup of its next generational manifestation.

Unlike selective processes of the past, it is independent of the environmental constraints and can be best described as a form of organizational based assembly of an ideal version of itself. This is where Alexander Bogdanov’s tektology comes into play.

Where Darwin’s selection, shaped as it was by the Malthusian metaphor of struggle for existence, emphasizes competition and survival of the fittest individual, Bogdanov’s assembly (podbor) means something closer to assembling or fine-tuning: the universal mechanism of the construction of any organization and its expediency.

This distinction is not merely semantic. It reflects a fundamentally different understanding of how organized systems come into being and evolve. For Darwin, organization is an incidental by-product of the competitive sifting of random variations. For Bogdanov, organization is the fundamental process itself, the creative assembling of elements into an expedient unity through the concordance of its parts.

And it is precisely the creative assembly by the phenotype which gave rise to the DNA that had ingressed the previous replication system into itself. And much like that, a new and more complex replication system will function on the skeletal structure of the DNA.

Much like societies become endlessly fine tuned in a utopian state, modern eugenics takes place without struggle for existence, but as another consumer based decision aimed at intergenerational self-improvement and with that improvement there will eventually emerge a more optimized version of coding and replicating.

Embryo selection, coupled with Artificial General Intelligence, will ultimately liberate humanity from environmental constraints and place our destiny firmly in our own hands.

The Dialectic of the Genotype and the Phenotype

We have established that the phenotype—the organized, living, acting complex—is in the driver’s seat of evolutionary change. The organism, through its developmental plasticity, its niche-constructing activities, and its active environmental modification, initiates the evolutionary innovations that genetic evolution subsequently consolidates. But this phenotypic primacy must be understood dialectically, not as an absolute negation of the genotype’s role but as a dynamic interplay in which each term conditions and transforms the other. As a form of a symbiogenesis of two mutually dependent elements into a single whole.

Here we arrive at a paradox that is central to the Right-Wing Progressive understanding of biological politics: the phenotype is the driver, but it is also temporary for the genotype can exist without the phenotype (albeit as a non-living code which decays) whereas the phenotype can exist without the genotype only at the most primitive life forms like prions. And so perhaps the genotype is primal in the sense of being the thread of continuity that links the generations. The one which stores information without which the phenotype cannot reproduce.

If we apply multi-level selection to this, we could come to a conclusion that while on the individual level, and on the level of progressive evolution the individual phenotype takes upon a primal role, on a collective level the genes win.

Consider what happens to an individual’s genetic contribution over time. A parent transmits roughly half of their genome to each child. A grandparent’s contribution to any grandchild is approximately one-quarter. By the sixth generation, a given ancestor’s contribution to any single descendant is about 1.56%. By the tenth generation, less than 0.1%. By the twentieth, the original individual’s genetic material has been so thoroughly diluted and recombined that it no longer exists as a coherent entity. It has been dissolved into the group’s collective pool.

I have looked at the history of many Russian great families and seen the transformation of political beliefs intergenerationally. A monarchist grandfather yields to a liberal reform-minded son, who yields to a revolutionary grandson, who yields to a Soviet functionary great-grandson, who yields to a post-Soviet capitalist great-great-grandson.

You can view this as an argument for why political views are more environmental than genetic and you could also view this as an argument for why at an unstable ecology the phenotype evolves too quickly and because of the pace of permutation, there is never a process of stabilization and therefore adequate transmission into the next generation.

Personally, I view it as the supremacy of the collective over the individual within multi-level selection. The individual organism lives for decades and may not always pass on their unique innovation but the gene pool of a population persists for millennia, constantly reshuffled but never entirely broken.

This asymmetry is of the greatest political significance. The Right-Wing Progressive must understand that the genotype exists within a group, not within an individual unit. No individual possesses the full genotype of the race or the nation; each individual carries only a fragmentary, idiosyncratic sample of the group’s total unique genetic heritage. It is the population, in its biological sense, that is the custodian of the genotype.

Place the group on the horizontal axis of symbiosis while the individual on the vertical access that I have invented for the purposes of an improved and modern theory of tektology. The individuals genetic innovation even if he’s highly successful does not not fully dissolve into the gene pool of the group and so eventually a group will break down into multiple groups due to the laws of differentiation, driven by the genetic drift of its various members away from each other, but that is a story for another time.

But until that happens, biological politics must focus not on the individual but on the group as a whole, not on the particular phenotype but on the conditions that shape the production of phenotypes across generations. What one generation holds sacred, the next may despise. What one generation builds, the next may destroy. The only enduring substrate is the group’s genetic heritage and even this endures only if the conditions of selection remain favorable.

The Right-Wing Progressive must internalize this lesson fully. The obsession with individual genetic fitness that characterizes much of the Evolutionary scene is not merely impractical but biologically misguided. The individual’s genetic legacy is ephemeral; only the group’s genetic heritage endures. Political action aimed at preserving and enhancing the quality of the group’s gene pool is therefore infinitely more consequential than any individual’s reproductive strategy. The individual who leaves ten children but contributes nothing to the cultural, institutional, and political conditions that shape the group’s selective environment has accomplished less than the individual who leaves two children but transforms the selective environment for the benefit of thousands.

If we analyze the question in terms of individual impact over 200 years, the individual who left a cultural legacy wins decisively over the individual who left merely a genetic legacy. The cultural legacy persists as a coherent, recognizable, and functionally consequential entity; the genetic legacy has been atomized beyond recognition. This does not mean that genetic continuity is unimportant. But it means that the most effective way to influence the evolutionary trajectory of the group is not through individual reproduction alone but through the modification of the selective environment through niche construction at the cultural, institutional, and political level.

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In the second part of the essay I will be making a general commentary about politics and what happens to the movement when it become mainstream and I will feature a discussion as to what it really means behind the paywall.

My original interest was sparked by this research article from Eric Kauffman alleging that America First is a civic nationalist movement.

Nick Fuentes is certainly temperamentally feels this way too. At least when he’s serious.

At the same time I should also say that it is pretty extreme for the rest of the American scene that just like Tucker Carlson would not even acknowledge race or touch upon the Jewish Question like Nick does every week. In this regard, Nick Fuentes is unique on the mainstream American scene. He talks about things others are afraid of talking and he talks about them intelligently.

But that being said, if over 75% of his audience truly have a civic-based conception of an American, the movement should probably not be called a White nationalist movement.

Nick himself doesn’t refer to himself a White nationalist anymore and has been making highly critical comments towards White Nationalists, distancing himself from them and concluding that they were delusional because the country is already multiracial.

Hard to disagree with Nick here. You can be pro-White and not buy into the Conservative goyslop or be anti-social. Like me, Nick Fuentes has a progressive soul. But that’s besides the point, as mentioned earlier, Nick and his audience have been undergoing an ideological evolution as part of their generational run.

In a poll that I conducted on Twitter, I asked two simple questions, whether or not someone was old or new follower of Nick Fuentes and whether or not they were White, politically right wing.

The results showed that:

• New White Nick Fuentes followers outnumbered new non-White Nick Fuentes followers by 4.2 times whereas old White Nick Fuentes followers outnumbered old non-White Nick Fuentes followers by 4.6 times.

• New and originally Right-Wing Nick Fuentes followers outnumbered new and originally Right-Wing Nick Fuentes followers by 2.8 times whereas old and originally Right-Wing Nick Fuentes followers outnumbered old and originally Right-Wing Nick Fuentes followers by 3.6 times.

That is to say that just like my previous article has established, the Groypers are not a brown movement, but as Nick’s audience grows the movement becomes diluted and this dilution is mostly ideological not-racial.

Eric Kauffman has essentially confirmed my analysis when you take a look at under 35 year olds.

Nick’s audience is not too White and it’s not too non-White. It’s about average.

Right now at least 7% of Americans are supportive of him which is at least 20 million people, whereas before 2022 let’s say, his supporters numbered only a few hundred thousand people.

There is Nick Fuentes, the core Groyper movement and the new followers who got redpilled by Hitler’s AI speeches. Nick Fuentes and core Groypers together probably accounts for around 5-20% of the entire America First movement whereas the overwhelmingly majority are new recruits don’t subscribe to White nationalism and often come from the left because Nick is funny and articulate. They just want to hear him speak more and they may agree with many of his positions, but as the data clearly shows there are many lines that they aren’t willing to cross.

For instance, up to 54% of his regular listeners could be described as antisemitic. This is higher than of any other show, but it certainly doesn’t pain a picture of a major boogey man that the Conservative establishment is trying to turn him into.

The Groypers don’t appear to be particularly hostile to Black people too. They like them significantly more than they like Jews. And of course, the Groypers have a degree of healthy in-group bias.

From personal experience and the recollection of other people, the movement was certainly way more radical before 2023 but with Nick’s total explosion in popularity after October 7th when he becomes the first main loud voice on the Right to criticize Israel intelligently, it is unsurprising that people from all over the political spectrum started tuning in. Here’s a typical (now deleted) comment written by a brown human capital:

Compare Nick’s performance to let’s say Candace Owens whose audience feels way warmer towards Israel despite believing Israel is literally Satan and peddling all kinds of weird conspiracy theories about it.

As I wrote in a previous Substack article, the core of the movement is visibly White, radical and generally loyal to Nick. The rest of the movement however, tends to be more non-White than previously, made up of new recruits and often coming from left leaning or a libertarian background. But let’s not overexaggerate this effect and the core compensates for it more than enough by being well educated movement, more politically active and literate than the Conservatives are which is why Groypers are 30-40% of the young Republican staffers in DC.

For the conservative establishment, this data is a double-edged sword.

On one hand, the moral panic surrounding Fuentes is largely overblown. The idea that he is commanding a massive, hidden army of hardcore neo-Nazis is statistically false. A significant portion of his audience tunes in because he is an articulate, entertaining, and fearless critic of establishment orthodoxies, not because they want to establish a White ethnostate. The fact that his audience is slightly more racist than the mainstream figures like Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens undercuts the caricature of the movement as uniquely and uniformly dangerous.

On the other hand, the establishment is right to be terrified of the competence of the core Groyper group. They are operating as a classic “vanguard.” In political theory, a vanguard doesn’t need the masses to agree with 100% of their radical ideology; they only need the masses to agree with the general direction and provide the numbers necessary to exert pressure. The influx of “brown human capital” and ex-leftists provides the sheer volume needed to legitimize the movement, while the educated, highly literate core handles the actual levers of institutional power. I will discuss this and other aspects in greater details behind the paywall.

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A treacherous foreign agent, a French villain, Fantomas in a Louis de Funès form factor—anyway, Andrey Rudoy has released a video titled “Why I Hate the USSR.” And he delivered kilotons of base, starting with the fact that killing people for their political views is f***ed up. Now he is trying to gaslight his audience, claiming he always thought this way.

But regardless, it’s a good thing. Discussions with the left—about tax rates, state ownership, taxes on oligarchs, the planned economy, the Soviet legacy, and so on—are permissible and, more than that, productive. We just need to start with a small disclaimer: you cannot kill people for a joke, for failing to hand over grain on time or not joining a collective farm, for the fact that their ancestors arrived in Russia from Bavaria 150 years ago, because their grandfather was a Tsarist general, or for not shoveling snow. And a ruler under whom all the above was the norm is garbage and an a**hole. Yes, “Grandpa Lenin” included.

But after 1953, the Soviet regime stopped killing people left and right, and instead launched a man into space (thankfully, they didn’t kill all the Katyusha designers; Korolev and Glushko survived the camps). And so I decided to try and honestly answer, at least for myself: what do I actually like about the Soviet legacy? Let’s go in order.

Politics and ideology are clear. Zero points there.

Daily life Soviet life I don’t like too. Endless rudeness always and everywhere, the likes of which today’s Zoomers couldn’t even dream of. Hours-long queues. Alcoholism on a scale that, again, would seem unreal to Zoomers. Perpetually filthy toilets. Even the eternal “No Vacancy” sign at any hotel at any time is hard for a Zoomer to imagine.

Disgusting quality of all services. A great stroke of luck was having a “friend” who was a butcher or an auto mechanic. All of this, note, does not directly depend on the standard of living. (Switzerland is one of the richest countries in the world, but the services there aren’t great either; you might wait two weeks for a plumber). It’s not just that Soviet society was very poor—it’s that daily life within it was organized atrociously.

Now for the main part—the economy. Well, it’s impossible to deny the successes of Soviet industrialization, right? We’ll try anyway.

The USSR was solving a problem that dozens (nearly a hundred in total now) of states have solved: the task of modernization—the transition from a traditional agrarian economy (and traditional society) to an industrial one. There is nothing unique about the task itself: everyone solved it, from Victorian England to modern-day Vietnam. What is unique is how poorly the USSR solved it.

The GDP per capita growth rates in 1928–40 were only 3.8% per year (data from the Maddison Project; also check this out).

[Growth of GDP per capita every decade]

But what about the massive growth in coal mining, pig iron smelting, and the production of cars and tractors—did that not happen? It did. But light industry (in the broad sense) grew much slower than heavy industry (and the latter, even in the broadest sense, made up a relatively small share of GDP). After collectivization, agricultural output collapsed and only barely recovered by the late 1930s. Railroads were built much more slowly than in the Tsarist era. By 1941, there was only one fully paved highway—Moscow-Minsk (which Guderian’s tanks rolled east on). As for small-scale production, like individual tailoring, it didn’t just fail to grow; it was deliberately crushed.

Housing construction, especially in large cities, proceeded at impossibly low rates; Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Minsk, and others experienced a horrific housing shortage. On the outskirts of Moscow, entire fields were covered not even by barracks, but by dugouts. A residential “dugout town” immediately appeared on the site of the demolished Cathedral of Christ the Savior in the very center of the capital (even before they started building the Palace of Soviets); Woland looks at this town from the balcony of the Pashkov House. In the late thirties, in the barracks of the Moscow “Hammer and Sickle” plant, a leading special steel producer, there was 1.6 square meters of living space per worker; in dormitories, 2.5 sq m. And this was one of the most advanced productions in the country.

Even in 1950, after the start of mass housing construction, only 27 million sq m would be commissioned in cities; in 1960, already 73 million (excluding housing built by collective farms and MTS). It wasn’t about the “struggle against architectural excesses”—even under Stalin, very few luxury houses were built—it was that Khrushchev finally began spending minimally adequate resources on housing.

According to data, in 1990 a Soviet citizen had about 10.6 square meters of living space per capita or 15.8 if you include non-living space.

In contrast, in the United States there are 70-90 square meters per person (depending on the calculation). Modern Russian data puts the average square meters per-person at 29 and it is projected to increase to 38sqm by 2036.

Here is a growth of Soviet GDP by various sections of the economy:

Note that this shows the growth of total, not per capita, GDP. It works out to 4.9% per year.

Now let’s put 3.8% per year into context. In 1890–1900, the rate was 3.3% per year. Roughly the same growth occurred in 1908–13, after the end of the war and revolution (note that in the latter case, growth occurred simultaneously with huge expenditures on modernizing the army and navy—just like in the 1930s in the USSR).

But let’s look at the world. Is 3.8% per capita a lot? Korea from 1961 to 1997 maintained a fantastic GDP growth rate of 7.6% per year. (Obviously, maintaining high growth for 36 years is much harder than for 12). China maintained an average annual rate of 6% from 1981 to 2021 (specifically in the 2000s it was also 7.6%). What a comparison, you might say! Those are the super-leaders of economic growth. Okay, here’s Brazil—a country few associate with an economic miracle: in the seventies, growth also reached 6%. Indonesia in those same years—almost 5%. I am specifically citing large countries, but examples could go on for a long time—I just don’t want to turn the post into “insomnia, Homer, taut sails, and the list of ships to the middle.” You can play with the data yourself.

But maybe 3.8% per capita growth was a unique result specifically for the thirties, when the Great Depression raged worldwide? No. In those same years, 1928–1940, Turkey’s growth was exactly the same—3.8%.

Well, it’s clear: Western capitalists are treacherously downplaying Comrade Stalin’s great achievements. On the internet, you can easily find Stalinist tales about growth in 1929–55 at 13.8% per year. The poor fools weren’t taught about compound interest in school, and they preach, without realizing it, about a thirty-fold growth in a quarter-century. (Which is nearly a million times in a century! Behold, the path to the techno-singularity). Indeed, there are estimates that bring per capita GDP growth in the first five-year plans up to 5% (the maximum among estimates worthy of attention). Even such a figure is completely unimpressive.

What is impressive is what accompanied these modest 3.8%. The number of famine victims in the early thirties is estimated by various researchers at between 2 and 9 million people. Our own beloved State Duma in 2008 gave an estimate of 7 million in its statement. In any case, these are horrific losses. The famine was not the result of Stalin’s cunning plan to destroy the peasantry. It was the result of transcendently inadequate plans, multiplied by the horrific cruelty and inflexibility of Stalin’s administrative apparatus. The standard of living, already low during the NEP, plummeted in the early thirties.

The GULAG became a mighty tool for mobilizing slave labor. The role of the prisoners shouldn’t be exaggerated—in the scale of the entire economy, there weren’t that many—but they could be used almost for free (just feed them somehow) for jobs that ordinary workers would only agree to for huge money (relative to income levels at the time).

All of this was an integral part of the Soviet model of “primary” industrialization; otherwise, it simply didn’t work. Again, dozens of countries solved a similar problem—without mass famine, without slave labor, and without lowering the standard of living (strictly the opposite).

Still, let’s agree: if we forget the costs, rapid industrial growth in a world raging with a global crisis—that counts as an achievement. But we must not forget the costs.

What came after? Having recovered fairly quickly after the war, the Soviet economy grew in the 50s and 60s at 3.5% (per capita GDP, again). Japan, the country of the model “economic miracle,” soared far beyond 8% in the sixties. In the seventies and eighties, growth dropped to 1–1.5%.

You likely don’t associate Greece with an economic miracle. But in 1950, Greek per capita GDP was half that of the Soviet Union, and by 1985, it was 30% higher.

Again, even if you add one percent to this growth, you get very sad results (no basis for such “adding” exists, by the way). But even for this growth, a bunch of disclaimers are needed. In the fifties, the development of Tatarstan oil began; in the sixties, Samotlor; in the seventies, oil prices rose (in real terms) about six times; in 1984, large-scale gas exports to Europe began. Let’s agree: the Soviet government’s merit in finding many resources in the vast Russian expanses is small. We don’t praise the sheikhs for the Persian Gulf having a lot of oil.

The USSR exported a relatively small share of its oil to the West, but this oil provided precious hard currency that could be spent on modern equipment and Canadian wheat. The USSR could offer Western countries practically nothing besides resources: almost all manufacturing products (non-military) were of such quality that Western companies didn’t want them for free.

Yaremenko, director of the Institute of Economic Forecasting, recalled that imported excavators accounted for 10–15% of the fleet in the USSR, yet they performed 60–70% of all work. (“Economic Conversations,” fifth conversation). But an excavator is not a CNC machine or a photolithography machine.

But something else is more important. The Soviet economy was transcendently resource-intensive. Several times more natural resources were spent per unit of national income than in the US—a country also very rich in resources and never a world leader in energy efficiency. At the same time, the share of investment (capital investment, what isn’t consumed but goes toward future growth) by the early eighties reached, by estimates, about 38% of GDP. This is far from the limit—the Chinese in the 2000s exceeded 50%—but they had corresponding results.

Billions of tons of valuable natural resources—metals, oil, coal, timber—were spent just on development programs. The Soviet Union, being a mid-developed country (ceteris paribus, the lower the development base, the faster the growth), spent insane amounts of resources on development—and barely crawled forward.

Shlykov writes that, by some estimates, Soviet metallurgy devoured more investment than the entire military-industrial complex. With all due respect to Shlykov, it would be cool if he gave at least some links.

William Easterly (I recommend his “The Elusive Quest for Growth,” by the way) wrote a famous paper showing that TFP growth—roughly speaking, the quality of using physical and human capital—in the USSR was the worst in the world (among countries for which there is relatively reliable statistics).

The Soviet economy was so resource-intensive that in many cases you could close an enterprise or a collective farm, put all workers on welfare equal to their salary, sell the resources used (in the case of a collective farm—fuel, fertilizers, metal for machinery) to the West for currency, and still stay in green. The fact that this economy survived a severe transformational slump in 1991–98 with an average annual growth of -4% is an indisputable and unquestionable economic miracle (with a minus sign), which had many causes, but the main one was Gorbachev’s fantastically incompetent economic reforms.

I highly recommend reading the interviews conducted by sociologist Belanovsky in the eighties.

If Biba cut off one of his arms and Boba cut off both, and Biba feels better than Boba, it doesn’t mean you should cut off one arm. You can cut off nothing and live happily. The catastrophe of the 90s doesn’t make the Soviet economy better or more efficient—on the contrary, it shows how difficult it is to come up with a good exit strategy from this horror. ... I want to talk separately about one graph. If you read Robert Allen’s famous book “Farm to Factory” (it was mentioned several times above, and I wrote a whole article about it), you might remember one graph there. Here it is—drawn a bit prettier than in the book itself, but the data is the same.

This graph became popular far beyond Allen’s circle of readers. What’s on it? On the horizontal axis—the initial level of GDP per capita in different countries. On the vertical axis—the growth rates in these countries for 1928–1970. The USSR is in second place in the world after Japan (the green dot at the very top). Impressive?

A wonderful article is dedicated to analyzing this one graph. If you’re too lazy to read—you can limit yourself to the graphs below.

First, everything depends on the choice of period. Change the end point.

Now change both the starting and end points.

And here is what happens if you look at the dynamics? There are many lines, but we need the bright red one.

Now we take countries where the per capita GDP was roughly equal to the imperial per capita GDP in 1913 (not sure Syria and Palestine are relevant here, but anyway). Look at the result.

And now we take the leader countries in per capita GDP growth in 1885–1913, which included the Empire. And here everything is quite sad. Finland and Japan succeeded. And for the sake of fairness, Argentina’s was even worse.

By skillfully manipulating statistics, you can “prove” directly opposite theses on the same set of data.

....

Let’s talk about education. We won’t touch the humanities—in the house of a hanged man, one doesn’t talk about rope. But technical education, according to Rudoy, was the “best in the world.” I have several reasons to doubt this.

First, it seems it was considered the best in the world only in the USSR itself. Well, okay.

Second. Income levels in education by 1980 were 63% of income levels in industry—not in some privileged branch, but in all industry, which accounted for close to half of those employed in the economy (tap, and tap). A rural teacher earning far less than a milkmaid and five to ten times less than a “shabashnik” (seasonal worker) who came for the summer to build cowsheds and pigsties (yes, they paid very well on rural construction sites), or a provincial university professor earning half as much as a high-grade milling machine operator—was a common story. It was even worse with equipment. To imagine an engineering faculty somewhere in a region with modern computers is impossible. They weren’t in Moscow universities either, and if they were—who would let an ordinary student near them.

Third, Soviet universities overproduced engineering and technical personnel in giant quantities (just as they would later overproduce “lawyers” and “economists,” in quotes). Engineers were transferred on masse to blue-collar jobs because workers earned much more. There is a 1983 Soviet production film “The Understudy Begins Work” where this is one of the main themes (not worth watching, boring, I don’t know why I watched it myself).

Finally, fourth. In 1992, the average monthly salary in the country was much less than a thousand rubles, the average dollar exchange rate on the exchange was one hundred rubles. Of course, it wasn’t like that throughout the nineties—it’s just that in 1992 the economy hadn’t had time to adjust to free currency exchange—but still, salaries in the country were laughable if converted to dollars. That’s when Western companies should have pounced on specialists with the best education in the world, starting to buy them up by the hundreds of thousands. It wasn’t even necessary to take the engineers anywhere—you could build an engineering center in the country itself. Boeing did in 1993. Soviet aircraft and rocket building was an “elite” industry. Hundreds of thousands of engineers designed and made planes and rockets in the USSR; at the peak, about a thousand worked in Boeing’s Moscow center. I am not aware of any other engineering center of a large Western company of similar scale.

You might say the language barrier interfered—Soviet engineers didn’t know English. That’s where the conversation about the best education in the world can end. Naturally, it’s impossible to get the “best in the world” education and not have the purely technical ability to find out what is happening in your field of knowledge in the world. About half of R&D spending in the 80s and 70s was in English-speaking countries. But it’s not just about the English-speaking countries themselves. I think today you would find it hard to find a Samsung, TSMC, Philips, Trumpf, or Airbus engineer who doesn’t know English (at least at a level that allows reading documents in their specialty). More than that: a person who received the “best in the world” education would, of course, learn a foreign language in a very short time without difficulty if life pressured them.

In the USSR, there was indeed a group of specialists who left for the US on mass, a group that was indeed hunted—not by companies, but by leading universities. These are theoretical physicists and “pure” mathematicians. They left by almost entire departments, entire sections of research institutes.

They say American theoretical physicists have a joke: if you have a good idea, it means half a century ago a paper was already written in Moscow based on that idea. A friend of a friend told me how in Amsterdam he accidentally started talking in a bar with an old man who spoke very good Russian. It turned out the old man was a quantum physicist, and it was simply impossible to do quantum theory in the sixties without the Russian language. So he learned it, what else could he do.

The fact that the USSR—a relatively poor country—turned out to be one of the two world leaders in the most fundamental sciences (mathematics and theoretical physics) seems very appealing to me personally. Yes, it wasn’t the original plan of the Soviet leadership, but just one of the side results of the nuclear project. Yes, young people went to study at the FOPF and the physics faculty of MSU/LSU, at the mechanics and mathematics faculties of the same universities not only out of love for science, but also because this education was a powerful social elevator and a direct path to a comfortable life with interesting work.

(Physicists, especially in the defense industry, often earned huge money and were provided for at the level of the party elite—like major aircraft engineers, for example. We don’t know the exact scale of rewards for “military” scientists. Unfortunately, the materials of the “Kremlin Seven,” the Military-Industrial Commission that sat in the Senate Palace—the one depicted on all Soviet banknotes—are still classified. The very fact of the existence of this powerful organization, which united seven “defense” ministries, became known to the public only in the 2000s).

But the fact remains: in the USSR, a poor, unsettled, poorly managed, ideologized, criminalized country—in the USSR there existed a powerful fundamental science, even if only in a couple of areas (in biochemistry or pharmacology, the USSR’s positions were, of course, incomparable with its positions in mathematics and physics). To me, this adds a little faith in humanity.

Another appealing feature of the Soviet past (quite well-preserved in the present) is the physics and mathematics schools. The fact that we are not doing too badly with mathematical education today is proven, for example, by the results of international olympiads (both school and student—in programming, for example). And not only in phys-math schools, but in schools in general—the TIMSS results are proof of that.

Phys-maths appeared largely by accident. In the late 50s, the military, or rather, scientists in uniform with big stars, demanded the creation of mathematical schools—they needed young people who in the future would be able to operate complex computers. The military was supported by academics—Semenov, Sakharov, Kolmogorov, and others. A letter to the Central Committee from four “defense” ministers—defense, aviation, radio, and electronic industry—was of key importance. For the Soviet authorities, phys-math schools were always an “alien element.” In Leningrad in the seventies, local authorities suppressed them with all their might: Sergei Rukshin, who worked as a teacher at School 239 then, recalls how a commission of 25 freeloading bosses would barge into his lessons. Phys-math schools were required to accept students not by competition, but by territorial principle (which, naturally, killed the very idea of such schools). Nevertheless, FMSH have survived to this day, and it seems to me that school education with an emphasis on mathematics is very cool and correct.

It’s not just that people who know mathematics well will always be needed. It’s also that mathematics simply clears the brain perfectly.

The main Russian conservative publicist in the 70s and 80s of the XIX century was Mikhail Katkov. He was simultaneously a conservative and a Westernizer—in particular, a supporter of transferring classical European gymnasium education to Russia, with an emphasis on Latin and mathematics. The Jesuits were the first to think of making such an emphasis. The idea here is as follows. It’s pointless to try to prepare a ready specialist right at school: a child doesn’t yet know what they want to do, and anyway—that’s not the task of the school. The task of the school is to accustom a small person to constant hard intellectual labor and, importantly, to accustom them not just to memorizing random bits of information, but to persistently, year after year, analyze the structure of a complex system.

Mathematics as an academic discipline has many interesting properties, but I will point out only one. A huge advantage of mathematics is that it shows everyone who practices it the limitations of their abilities. You try to solve a problem, nothing works, and at the end a solution comes—or you just read the solution in the answer key. And you are amazed at how simple everything is and how stupid you are if you couldn’t figure it out yourself. This... is refreshing.

In general, phys-math schools and the emphasis on mathematics in school education as a whole is another inherited feature from the USSR that seems positive to me. I may be wrong; correct me if so.

...

There is also medicine. Not my topic, I won’t write much, just a few strokes.

Rusecon sent me his forthcoming article about the state of medicine not somewhere in the backwoods, but in the hero-city of Leningrad, the cradle of three revolutions, in the 70s–80s. There is much that is impressive there, but one thing especially. In a children’s hospital, there has been no hot water for four months, and the ceiling in one of the departments has collapsed. Repairs are planned for two years from now. This is from official inspection materials.

In the seventies, infant mortality began to grow in the RSFSR (!)—though not by much. In 1980, infant mortality was 2.21%. Do you know how much it is in 2024? 0.4%. You might think this is thanks to new medicines; but Japan reached roughly the same figure back in the 1980s. It’s not about miracle drugs, but about the catastrophic underfunding of obstetric care in the Soviet system.

The first successful heart transplant in history was performed by South African Christiaan Barnard in 1967. (Three days later, the first transplant was already done in the US, and a month later—the first successful one). Barnard considered Vladimir Demikhov his teacher, and he specifically went to his laboratory to learn from his experience. Do you know when the first successful heart transplant was performed in the USSR? In 1987. The numbers 6 and 8 look so similar, don’t they.

...

Having dealt with serious things, let’s talk about the subjective—culture. First, literature. Personally (tastes differ), I like many writers and poets from the USSR. Bulgakov, Rubtsov, Shukshin, Astafiev, Shalamov, even Brodsky or Zoshchenko. As is easy to notice, all of them at best existed parallel to mainstream Soviet culture. Well, okay, “And Quiet Flows the Don” and some of Simonov’s poems are also good, but that’s not much. The “core” of Soviet literature is Ostrovsky’s “How the Steel Was Tempered” and other indescribable crap. It’s hard for me to imagine a person who today would be interested in “production dramas” by venerable proletarian masters of the pen whose names no one remembers.

Architecture? Personally, I am indifferent to constructivism, and Brezhnev’s brutalism is some kind of junk. Stalinist Empire style is generally boring and monotonous. True, the Stalinist skyscrapers are indeed beautiful, although building them in a starving country ruined by war was a crime. The MSU building is magnificent, but you have to understand that even today such a building would be transcendently expensive. Glass-box skyscrapers are built not because everyone loves “glass and concrete,” but because it’s cheaper.

And in general, the best example of Soviet architecture is, of course, the New Arbat. Khrushchev went to Cuba and really liked the luxurious tall hotels built along the embankment. He wanted Moscow to have the same. The phantasmagoric absurdity of Posokhin’s “books,” moved from the tropics to the center of a huge northern city, is a good metaphor for the entire Soviet project.

Movies? I’m not going to act like a snob and say I’m indifferent to Soviet films. I love the comedies of Gaidai, Danelia, Ryazanov, and the series about Stierlitz, and “Nine Days of One Year,” and “Office Romance,” I like watching Mironov or Mikhalkov on the screen. Terribly enough, there is even a production drama that I like—”The Bonus” with Leonov in the main role. You can’t say that good movies aren’t made at all today—but very few are made, certainly fewer than then. So, do we agree with BadComedian?

First, we know dozens of good Soviet films—and we don’t know thousands of bad ones. Open a Wikipedia article “List of Soviet feature films (19xx)”—pick any year—and count how many of these films you’ve watched. Since Grandpa Lenin decided that the most important of the arts for the Bolsheviks is cinema (without any circus!), then a lot of money was spent on cinema. If you shoot a lot—some part will inevitably be good.

This is the highest-grossing film in the history of the USSR. Have you seen it?

Second, outside the USSR, Soviet films were almost not watched. Mosfilm never had a chance to become Hollywood. Cinema collapsed in the nineties not only because state funding ended, but also because everyone got the opportunity to watch whatever they wanted. And they wanted to watch the Terminator and the Titanic.

And finally, the Stanislavski method and Russian theater in general were not invented by commissars in dusty helmets.

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I don’t want you to think for a moment that I represent the late USSR as hell on earth. Life then differed from life now much less than from the terrible meat grinder of the thirties. But I honestly don’t see anything valuable in the Soviet past, except for such a small detail as the emphasis on mathematics in education (well, and a few good movies that can be rewatched).

In general, comrade Communists, who for some reason decide to read this text: let’s agree with you on two points. First, you cannot kill people you don’t like. Second, you need to grind mathematics (coding, physics, even—perish the thought—economics, just not political economy, but normal, at least the linear programming you love). You can, if you must, grind for the glory of communism.

…

In my own substack post dedicated to measuring GDP change relative to the world’s average after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I have calculated Russia as one of the economic winners from the collapse of the USSR.

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My next post is going to be about Nick Fuentes and it will also turn into a video.

First thing I’ll say is that you should expect things like that more often on the right than they appear. That is to say, people in this sphere are living a double life, a trad conservative online and a sexually promiscuous drug addict who likes partying in their private life let’s say. Obviously, a minority of people do that, but it is a significant minority and this minority is more prevalent at the top echelons of power than at the bottom.

As one of my older videos on YouTube has established; this sort of thing is nothing new because right wing e-celebs tend to rank higher in dark triad personalities.

Influencers, and those who seek fame tend to be quite are quite narcissistic and high in dark triad personality.

The pursuit of social status is the primary motivation of narcissism and once this status is achieved a narcissist is able to excuse their interpersonal behavior by appealing to their higher social standing or justify it by proclaiming their own larger social mission.

Noteworthy enough is the fact that people in Elijah Shaffer’s condition, that is those who suffer from substance and drug addiction tend to be like 5 times more psychopathic than the general population.

Any degenerate action after that simply becomes excused by an appeal to social status until a the public comes to terms with the fact that somebody is talking the talk but not walking the walk and thus the influencer is finally confronted with what they did by their own source of status: the public that supported them.

What happened with Sarah Stock and Elijah Shaffer was the public doing precisely that and I would like to discuss the two approaches that the influencers can take in response to the backlash.

The Giving Up Approach

Both Sarah Stock and Elijah Shaffer show elevated traits associated with histrionic personality. However, as a woman, Sarah Stock is more susceptible to intense social pressure and the effects of a coordinated online hate campaign directed against her. Besides, she maintained the persona of a pure virgin that is a model for trad-women worldwide and the simps coming to terms with what she did, understandable caused a lot of anger.

Her initial response was complete silence, followed by a tweet in which she attempted to salvage her reputation, and ultimately culminating in the deletion (or deactivation) of her social media accounts.

Latest report from the founder of AF Post suggest Sarah Stock has decided to step away from politics entirely.

Because Sarah Stock was a highly praised Conservative female influencer, the public opinion shifting 180 degrees overnight is clearly something that she could not handle. Her online persona got exposed and she gave-up.

From a position of moral accountability, perhaps it is the proper response, but from the position of career survival, this is a very dumb move because that is career suicide. Instead, she should have taken the Elijah Shaffer approach, who is frankly accused of more serious things than not living-up to trad-wife standards.

The Doubling Down Approach

Elijah Shaffer got accused of pretty serious shit including homosexuality, promiscuity, drug addiction and being a poor husband. Like with regards to Sarah Stock, there isn’t much conclusive evidence for a bulk of it, but instead of quitting social life Elijah Shaffer chose the Steven Crowder road:

Immediately after the incident Elijah Shaffer fired back at Milo, using comedy to his advantage. He took little accountability and instead turned the arrows to the person who started this.

Unlike Sarah, Elijah showed he doesn’t care about public opinion—even if three-quarters of the audience turns against him, he’ll keep doing what he’s doing. That’s essentially what happened with Steven Crowder, who doubled down on his side of the story and refused to show any sign of losing the argument and eventually after enough repetition his audience came back to him.

I did a poll asking whether or not Elijah Shaffer recover from this and the audience was divided 50/50.

I am the only one who is confident that he will, because Vrillium, Nick Fuentes and many others have recovered despite being canceled multiple times throughout their career by their own fans. The key is to never admit defeat and after enough time people would forget everything about it.

Obviously, I don’t want to excuse any of their actions and I believe that the crowd is ultimately right about them, I’m just saying that the crowd is addicted to hearing their political opinions, not how good of a personal life they’re living. Yes, they’re disappointed, but the crowd will still be for Elijah until he gives up himself.

This is just how life is in general, think of how many times Conservatives and many Leftists have accused Leftist influencers of being hyper-capitalist or not “walking the walk” in other realms of their personal life and how absolutely nothing changed. How the Conservative arguments are continuingly dismissed by their fans, while their hyper-luxurious and classist lifestyle gets excused by the fact that they’re doing something for the movement. This is just another variation of this phenomena but in the social-Conservative arena.

As Nick Fuentes said, he wants to have an OnlyFans wife because at least she’s real about who she is. Perhaps a regular Sarah Stock wouldn’t have cheated on William Setka, but a Sarah Stock influencer, seeking power and career advancement would and that is a common occurrence in circles of power.

You either live a fake trad persona or you come to terms with what you are and live accordingly with your true biological inclinations like Ghislaine Maxwell and Nick Fuentes. The reality is that honest trad lifestyle is going to appeal only to a select number of people and it appears that neither of these people were among them.

One of the tweets I made during this controversy is that if Elijah Shaffer (and Sarah Stock) were Jewish then they wouldn’t have landed in the shit that they have.

I fully stand by that assessment. If there’s one thing the crowd got especially furious about, it’s that they’ve woken up to the realization that they were sold an inauthentic life. If Sarah and Elijah were honest about themselves like Nick Fuentes is honest about himself, then the crowd wouldn’t have reacted so poorly. People should just not create false expectations because once a facade falls down, many of the people believing in that facade would feel betrayed.

That is the main reason why I chose to come forward with my ethnic background so that later down the line I wouldn’t be cancelled over it by chuds. I’m also not trying to pretend like I am a super-traditionalist, a religious person or any of the chud-coded things because I respect and love what I am genetically wired to be.

Honestly, my biggest advice to newcomers to politics on the Right would be to be open and honest about who you are. That way you won’t create false expectations and build an audience that won’t cancel you for living your life inauthentically.

The Discourse

Finally, I’d like to talk about the Discourse all of this has generated. While I do enjoy the memes, I believe the public went to aggressive with it and the fact that’s it’s being amplified by vicious actors on both the left and the Zionist aligned right isn’t helping the case.

First of all, we’ve got Milo who is power-tripping right now as he’s pretending not to get overly excited about what he’s done.

Not sure this is a very wholesome development. If these leaks had to be dropped, I’d prefer someone else doing it and not out of vicious motifs pretending to be the paragon of virtue.

Then we’ve got a bunch of leftists who feel vindicated of their ideology, because supposedly every Conservative wants to cheat on their spouse, get pegged and hallucinate from hard drugs and the leftists are just doing it freely.

Obviously, things like that are hurting the movement and I’d frankly prefer if these two remained closeted. When a person makes a decision to publish sensitive information like this they are doing this with full knowledge that the entirety of the right will be painted in these colors.

That being said, once the information is out, there is no point in doing damage control and neither of them have appeared to deny anything of what’s been said about them. They just picked two separate strategies of coping: full withdrawal and going on an offensive.

At the end of the day, absolutely nothing has changed for me. I knew these things were happening behind the scenes with many of these influencers and so my bias got confirmed once again. If this is news for you then I’m sorry, but welcome to the real world, many of the influencers who are doing politics are doing it for sensation seeking, attention and career advancement and virtue is not as important to them as it is to you.

As one of the studies documented:

The strong association between psychopathy, FoMO, and online political participation suggests that emotion and social-driven political participation may be motivated more by sensation-seeking and impulsivity rather than deliberative civic engagement.

Finally, to make you completely black-pilled, much of what we’ve discussed is dependent on IQ and so you would definitely expect smart influencers to engage in this stuff even more often than what data suggests.

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That said, I wish everyone all the best, including Sarah Stock and Elijah Shaffer and especially William Setka. I will be missing Sarah Stock and I wish that she didn’t delete her YouTube channel because there is an interview I bookmarked and didn’t have the time to watch. I guess I will never see it.

There will be two breakdowns of the data in my analysis.

Level One: free and will focus largely on categories.

Level Two: Paid only and it will focus on the interaction of categories, like how does having a Jewish/Russian ancestry makes one answer certain questions. How does mental illness effects one’s political views, what are upper-classes’ political views, the correlation between age and political views, attitude towards Nick Fuentes broken by ideology or 26 more infographics in which more than half of them are a compilation of multiple data-points.

The total sample size as of writing this article is n=228 and the breakdown of each category goes as follows…

Most of you found me on YouTube, then Twitter and the Sybstack with Telegram (surprisingly). I have expected Twitter to top this chart and Substack to do at least 15% but we have what we have.

Unsurprisingly most of you also want me to focus on YouTube as opposed to other platforms. Best I can do right now is one video a month but we will see if I’ll be able to increase the uploading schedule to two if not three videos a month throughout the year.

When it comes to the Russian breakdown at least 80% of you are White.

and without counting Anatoly Karlin 93% of you are male.

When it comes to locations about half of you are American. Anglosphere in total constitutes at least 55% of the total amount of responses. Surprisingly no Israel can be found.

The second largest group are the Europeans and then barely anyone reads me.

When it comes to the age, I am older than at least 60% of my own follower (I’m 26) and just 3% of my total followers can be described as being old.

Most common ideology among my followers is Right-Wing Progressivism, which is to say that I managed to convince at 26% of you into adopting it. I am impressed and thankful to you. The rest follows a usual trajectory, Conservatives are second largest demographic, then Fascists, then Libertarians and then non-political as well as 6% of Liberals/Centrists and Leftists who are also consuming my content.

Interestingly enough, the absolute majority of you agrees with the core principles of right-wing progressivism. Just 28-34% of you are NGMI’s.

Most of you are also Christians, although there are other esoteric beliefs among you. Since I am not brown-coded I’ve got very few Muslims and Hindus and the Muslims I have are probably Turks or Bosnians.

Most of you appear to be coming from upper-middle class, but some of you are underclass.

In the United States, 12% of the population belongs to the underclass versus just 3% in my audience and about 1-5% of the US population belongs to the upper-class versus 12% in my sample. That is to say, you are very EHC-coded.

When it comes to sharing my ethnicity, 8% of you are partially Russian and 4% are fully Russian or identify exclusively as Russian. I looked at the emails and names of those who identified as partially Russian and half of them had Western sounding names and email addressed, or were located in the West, which is to say that they are the descendants of Russian immigrants into the West. One Tatar name has also identified as partially Russian as well as one person who practiced Judaism.

Furthermore, 6% of you are Mischlings like myself and just 1% are full-Jews, which is to say that my content is highly Mischling-friendly and not particularly Jewish coded.

7-11% of you are spiteful mutants (see how it relates to ideology later on) and 28-43% of you are larping.

Most of you like Philosophy and play video games. Just 4-13% of you do not, which is to say that video games and philosophy are highly EHC-coded.

60% of you are not racist, though 5/6 of that 50% acknowledges that society views them this way due to the beliefs they had adopted. 40% of you are openly racist. When it comes to Nationalism, just 6% of you disapprove.

Just 22% of you refuse to accept that Jews have higher IQs than Gentiles and when it comes to conspiracy theories in general, most of you have taken a nuanced position of “believe sum of dem” (I probably should have broken it down better). In total only 18% of you could be classified as sharing the proper EHC position on the conspiracy question and 43% on the Jewish question.

Vast majority of you believes that history is driven by Great Individuals, followed by Evolutionary Forces. What I am surprised the most about is that Institutions ranked below material conditions. I expected material conditions to rank way lower than 49%.

When it comes to estimating the main enemies of the Right, 23% share the assessment of right-wing progressivism which is that the political system itself is broken because it is not operating like the market is. 20% of you believe it’s the left, 18% of you believe it’s our own side, 17% of you believe it’s the Jews and Immigration, dysgenics, women, current economic system and illiberalism take the remaining 22%.

Here is how Right-Wing Progressivism compares to other ideologies in answering this question:

The attitudes towards various people are going to be illustrated in the following chart:

It turns out my audience likes the most. Second spot goes to Nick Fuentes, though a considerable amount of you hate him. Most hated people in my audience on the other hand are Candace Owens and Andrew Tate.

I was also surprised by the Elon Musk hate and didn’t expect my audience to have such mixed views towards the God killer. Another interesting observation is that all of the people I trash-talked you hate also.

The countries’ list is arguably more interesting. Your hatred is directed toward India, followed by Israel, with the European Union coming in a distant third. You are also highly pro-American, followed by Russia and then China, although I should mention that more of you dislike both China and Russia than like it, nonetheless, Ukraine, Palestine or the EU doesn’t come close to generating the positive emotional reception that Russia does.

Some of you have labelled me a Third-Worldist for supporting a Palestinian state, yet as you can see, most of my audience is not Third-Worldist nor likes the Palestinians very much, they just don’t like what Israel is doing. Same for Ukraine, it does not generate positive emotions in and of itself, people who support it or Palestine support them out of ideological/moral principles or realpolitik, not because they trans-heart them.

What I am shocked the most is to see the EU being rated so poorly. That said, given how badly the EU is fumbling its own economy and immigration policies and now hostile it is to European nationalism, I can’t really blame readers for preferring China’s performance over Brussels’ stagnation and mismanagement.

Nonetheless, I generally agree with my followers in terms of rankings of various people + states, though I’d put Israel higher because, despite their war-crimes and hatred of the other, they are a highly successful civilizational-state. I’d also rate the EU and India higher than what you gave them lol. I don’t like large-scale Indian migration into the West, but India hasn’t really done anything as a state to deserve this much hostility unlike Israel let’s say. Recently they have even overtaken the Russians to the Moon. I believe that amount of hostility is not warranted unless they try their luck with Pakistan again.

TLDR; My audience is very pro-American, anti-EU, is mixed on Russia, is curious but antagonized towards China and not brown-coded in any way. Based?

You want me to produce population and history content the most. Noted. Funny enough you ranked popular people the least, yet my articles and videos on Nick Fuentes and Clavicular did really well so someone is lying.

80% of you also views my Substack as educational content while 30% of you considers me an expert which is pleasant to read about.

When it comes to giving me Shekels, 47% of you theoretically suppose that’s possible.

Thanks for reminding me that I need to pay-wall information more often. But I’ll also need to create some exclusive perks and premium content. Will think about it. Among “other” responses, these were the funniest:

Most of you list the lack of money as the primary concern for refusing to give me big shekels. I wish to them luck in getting more money as well as some financial management advice that I may also need to take myself:

Your specific requests about the type of content I should produce more of are also interesting. Some of them will eventually be produced by the end of the year.

That’s it. The remaining half is going to be behind the pay-wall. If you are not yet convinced of upgrading to paid subscription, here is a little teaser of the type of information that you’re about to see:

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Delayed for roughly a year, this piece is finally seeing the light of day just as US-Europe geopolitical tensions reach a boiling point while it appears that the Ukraine war is about to come to a conclusion.

This is my re-editing of the article which first appeared on America First Post.

Present Situation:

Russia and the United States were bitter rivals and the only dominant global superpowers of the latter half of the twentieth century. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the capacity to compete on an equal footing with the United States, declining from a global superpower to a regional one, lacking the ability to project power or exert pressure on the American continent and becoming focused on its own tiny sphere of influence.

In contrast, in their new national strategy the Americans make it very clear that the United States is looking to impose economic pressure on China and deter it from controlling the South China Sea, while also exerting diplomatic and soft-pressure on the Europeans to be more aligned with American-Conservative standards.

Russia’s current confrontation with the West is largely confined to its immediate sphere of influence, while the informational war it wages takes the form of supporting far-right and pro-Russian factions within the Western world as a means of restoring relations.

If you take a look at Russia’s political interference into the European theater, it is nearly identical to the US’ model of “Making Europe Great Again”. In other words Russia is supporting the same European factions like AfD, Orban that the United States is supporting: Nationalist and Conservative Eurosceptics.

Russia’s interference in the American political scene—whether through outlets such as Tenet Media or figures like Dugin likewise aims to cultivate Christian-nationalist, pro-Trump, and conservative forces within the United States. In this sense, despite the differing character of the two regimes, as ironic as it is, the Trump administration promotes many of the same social values advanced by the Russian government and views the ideological landscape in a similar way as does Putin.

Furthermore, both Russia and the United States are appreciated by the populist right wing faction of the European Union which implies that a US-Russian rapprochement will also benefit Europe in the long run as it will cool down the tensions.

Russian American Friendship in the 2000s:

The US and Russia have been allies and rivals many times in history. Last time, it occurred in the early 2000s, when Russian President Vladimir Putin developed a fantastic relationship with his American counterpart and even warned George W Bush of potential danger coming from Bin Laden months before 9/11, causing a bonding effect between Russia and the United States.

On the fifth anniversary of 9/11, the Russian government presented the United States with a 100-foot statue commemorating the victims of the September 11 attacks and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The monument still stands to this day and it is the second largest monument/sculpture that the US has received from a foreign power, but Putin’s name is now covered by two plaques.

Putin also made multiple public and private attempts to join NATO in the early 2000s, both to Clinton and to Bush. These attempts weren’t heard and the United States prioritized dragging Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance, despite Russia’s protests, ultimately causing Russia to invade Georgia in 2008 which has greatly worsened the US-Russia relations.

In 2009, the US and Russia tried restoring relations again, and in the first few years, the results were highly successful for both. Russia was allowed into WTO and as a sign of reciprocity it joined the American sanctions against Iran, supported the NATO military operation against Libya and provided the American-NATO forces with a transit hub inside of Russia as part of the Northern Distribution Network.

There were negotiations about no-visa between Russia and the European Union and also discussions of Russia joining the Union. That was a time of normalization and clear Russian alignment with the West and the United States as opposed to BRICS and China as it is now the case.

Chinese-Russian Alliance and Reverse Nixon:

Russia’s current partnership with China is widely perceived by Russian analysts as unequal and exploitative. Because China is the far more powerful state, it often dictates trade and diplomatic terms that favor its own interests. If Russia-China rapprochement were to deepen, it would be a matter of time before China starts to openly exert influence over Russian domestic politics, rendering the relationship increasingly suffocating.

If such a scenario were to materialize, Russia could effectively become a Chinese client state with China potentially leveraging Russian territory as a strategic corridor for a land-based military thrust into the European Union or using Russian natural resources and territory to transport sanctioned goods and raw-materials if it finds itself at war with the United States, should it deem this necessary.

For better or for worse, due to its immense human resources, higher intelligence and productive capability China will overtake the United States as the leading world superpower sometime this century and it is not certain that China would limit itself to Eurasia.

The United States currently faces a roughly 0–15 year window of opportunity to fracture the Russian–Chinese alliance and replace it with an alternative one more compatible with Russia’s cultural identity and geostrategic interests.

Russia may not be a democracy now, but Russian elites have arrived at almost the same cultural convictions as the Trump administration. Russian increasing dependence on China would certainly not help in it becoming a Western state again.

Bottom-Up Incentives For An Alliance:

While American attitudes towards Russia are generally negative, despite all what happened the Russians appear to be positively inclined towards the United States.

These attitudes are most prevalent among the young and the highly educated, suggesting that any potential alliance with Russia would likely emerge as an intergenerational coalition driven primarily from below.

Furthermore, if we look at the dynamic of Russian attitudes towards the United States, positive attitudes have predominated right until the second term of the Obama (September 2013 was the tipping point) administration and have significantly worsened under Biden before semi-normalizing under Trump.

Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, Russians appear to have an instinctive positive inclination toward Trump and the Republican Party—regardless of its stance on Russia. My survey analysis of Russian Canadians supports this: they tend to favor the Conservative Party here, even though it takes an anti-Russian line. This suggests the attraction is fundamentally a matter of temperament, which is supported by further data from Eastern Europe, which tends to be anti-Russian yet supportive of Trump nonetheless (unlike Western Europe).

Geostrategic Benefits and Practical Advantages of a US-Russian alliance:

There are clear geo-strategic benefits for a US-Russian alliance. First, Russia is a middle-man between the East and the West. It is a land bridge empire which stretches from the European Union to China, thus is able to exercise American influence on both European Union and China if needed.

The geostrategic landscape of Eurasia puts Russia in a vulnerable position because both China and the EU are significantly more powerful than Russia and thus for security reasons it is natural for Russia to seek allies from other places, which is why her strategy has been to seek a closer alignment with India recently. The United States is likewise not interested in a strong European Union nor strong China and so it can use Russia as a way of projecting its own power, since Russia will naturally not be able to compete with the United States unlike the EU or China.

Second, Russia possesses immense collection and production abilities of natural resources which can be extracted to fuel the American economy, as opposed to fueling the Chinese and the European economies as it is done now. Furthermore, these resources can also work as a form of a planetary leverage since both the United States and Russia control a huge percentage of the world’s resource market. Elevated or sunken prices on an important commodity are far-more effective than tariffs. The 1973 oil embargo inflicted severe damage on the global economy, while Trump’s tariffs, in their current form, appear to be producing only marginal effects.

Finally, there does not appear to be any natural animosity between the US and Russia besides the expansion of NATO or ideological culture wars, whether fought by Russia or the Obama-Biden administrations with USAID funding. If the United States and Russia align, there would not be any incentives for Russia to aggressively push against the West since its main geopolitical rival is now an ally. Another war in Europe will become structurally disincentivized unless the Europeans will push against the United States or Russia. There would definitely not have been a Ukraine war if the United States and Russia were friends.

Likewise, a U.S.–Russian alliance would benefit the European Union in the long run by eliminating the perception of a Russian threat and allowing confidence and trust to be gradually restored. America does not need to choose between prioritizing the Europeans or the Russians, both can be done at the same time as Russia and EU are natural economic partners, unless the United States goes for Greenland.

The primary difference between an American-Ukrainian or an American-Israeli alliance is that an alliance with Russia is likely to cost the US zero pennies whereas the economic and geo-strategic benefit for the United States is going to be enormous, whether we’re talking about resource extraction, mutual technological projects like the ISS or stationing of US troops inside of Russia as a means of deterrence.

Any alliance system is built on reciprocity, and an alliance that is not reciprocated or is perceived to be one-sided cannot be sustained and will eventually dissolve. The American–European and American–Israeli alliances are structurally vulnerable in this regard, as the United States performs the bulk of the strategic heavy lifting. By contrast, it is difficult to see how this asymmetry would apply to a U.S.–Russian alignment.

Understanding the Russian Perspective:

The main pretension of Russian elites towards the West is that the West is trying to isolate Russian involvement with the West, causing Russia to look elsewhere. Putin started off as a pro-Western leader with dreams of joining NATO and a united Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, but since the second term of the Obama’s administration this dream was crushed and Russia and West became hostile to each other.

We know why Westerners are hostile to Russia, but it is also important to acknowledge why the Russians are hostile towards the West and understanding the Russian siege mentality is key to that question. The Russians perceive the West—by which they really mean a liberal-globalist world order—as encroaching on their territory, starting from Georgia, the 2011 Russian protests and finally Euromaidan. However, we on the Right recognize that this encroachment constitutes not only a threat to Russia, but for ourselves and our way of life.

Most NAFOid and neoconservative activists believe that the reason Russia is so aggressive is because the West was too lenient with it. Ignoring the economic sanctions over the annexation of Crimea, the exclusion from G8 and the subsequent sponsorship of Ukraine against Russia (including sending it javelins), have all predated the 2022 invasion, after which Russia became the most sanctioned country on Earth with no access to SWIFT, travel to the West, or foreign banks. The total amount of money sent to Ukraine for the direct purposes of defeating Russia militarily amounts to about 350 billion dollars.

If that is what’s called being “soft on Russia”, then being hard on Russia implies a direct military aggression by NATO countries. The result of these policies is Russia becoming more isolated from the Euro-Atlantic block, while simultaneously more engaged with the rest of the world. By expanding BRICS and deepening its economic dependence on China, India, North Korea, and Iran, while simultaneously increasing its trade surplus and GDP—Russia has demonstrated that it cannot be isolated from the world, but that it can be pushed out of the Euro-Atlantic zone.

The continued authoritarian tilt of Putin and further rejection of values that are deemed to be euro-Atlantic, along with the repression of political figures, cannot be looked at outside of this context as they are directly perceived—much like Georgescu and Orban are perceived in the EU—as “agents of the enemy.” Russia’s attacks on free speech are directly tied to concerns over national security.

The policy of beating our chests in hopes of cornering Russia achieved a completely opposite result: Russia became further authoritarian, further expanded BRICS and finally invaded Ukraine.

But let me remind that the Soviet Union was not defeated in the Cold War economically nor militarily, it effectively decided to dissolve itself over the partnership with the West and the United States which was in-effect until the early 2010s.

Vision Forward:

The mistrust between Russia and the United States arose from Washington’s insistence on extending liberal-globalist ideology into Russia. In response, the Russian elite reacted aggressively by purging liberal-globalist elements both within Russia and in its periphery, thereby further antagonizing the West.

Perhaps for the first time since the second world war an American president no longer sees the United States as the leader of the free world, and so the ideological obstacles towards allying with Russia are dropped. Trump pursues a foreign policy which maximizes American interests over international good moral upstanding.

This explains his want to be aligned with authoritarian regimes like Saudi-Arabia as well as countries whose leaders are given an arrest order against by the International Criminal Court (Israel and Russia).

By pursuing high-stakes interests in Venezuela, Iran, and Greenland, the U.S. is adopting a 'realpolitik' framework that aligns with Russia's own tactics. This erosion of liberal-globalist standards paradoxically pushes the United States and Russia closer together.

Putin’s favorite philosopher Ivan Ilyin had this to say on the United States:

Only the United States are instinctively inclined to prefer a unified, national Russia as a non-dangerous counterweight and as a large, loyal, and solvent buyer. In all other countries and among all other peoples, we are alone, misunderstood, and “unpopular.”

Recent peace negotiations over Ukraine prove that Putin like Ivan Ilyin trusts the Americans over the Europeans and now there is a golden opportunity for the US to pull Russia away from China.

If you don’t believe me just contrast how President Putin sits with European leaders versus how he sits with the Americans. Look at the body language.

Conclusion:

The historical record suggests that the current era of hostility is not an inevitability, but a consequence of specific ideological choices. For decades, the West pursued a policy of expansion and liberal-globalist conversion that disregarded the security concerns and cultural identity of the Russian state. This strategy has reached its logical dead end: it has not isolated Russia, but has instead midwifed a formidable Eurasian bloc led by Beijing, leaving the United States increasingly vulnerable.

Today, the emergence of an America First realism offers a rare corrective. By stripping away the requirement for ideological conformity, the United States can finally view Russia for what it is—not an existential evil to be conquered, but a vital land bridge power whose interests naturally conflict with a rising China and a rogue European bureaucracy. An alliance based on reciprocity would transform Russia from a cornered adversary into a strategic counterweight, securing the Western Hemisphere while stabilizing the Eurasian heartland.

As the Ukraine war is coming to an end, a new security framework must be reestablished, that which includes Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the United States, preventing future wars between the four.

Certainly, the Russian public opinion is slowly moving towards a pro-Western direction and it is within reason to expect that much the of Russian cultural milieu would become Americanized as a result of this alliance much like the Russian Empire became Westernized as a result of deep partnerships with other European countries. Russia that imagines itself in an alliance with Americans will be much easier to hold than Russia that is thinking of itself as an independent and hostile anti-Western state.

As the window to fracture the Sino-Russian axis narrows, Washington must choose: continue the cycle of hostility, or pursue a bold realignment that brings Russia back into the Western fold. The recent comments of Russian officials confirm that they are very much open to an alliance, which will eventually lead to the re-Westernization of Russia and restoration of peace on the European continent.

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Unfortunately his screenshot is too poor to give a proper estimate and the data is lightly outdated and so I decided to look into the data myself, and thankfully my data is 2 years younger than his.

I acquired the data for 8th grader math performance in 2024 from a governmental website and then converted them into IQ.

The score means that I obtained are as follows:

• District of Columbia: 304

• DoDEA: 285

• Massachusetts: 276

• Connecticut: 275

• New Jersey: 275

• Hawaii: 274

• Colorado: 273

• Maryland: 272

• Georgia: 271

• Illinois: 270

• California: 269

• Indiana: 269

• Rhode Island: 269

• Arizona: 268

• Louisiana: 267

• Ohio: 267

• Texas: 267

• Washington: 267

• Minnesota: 266

• Pennsylvania: 266

• Tennessee: 266

• Utah: 266

• Virginia: 266

• Wisconsin: 266

• Idaho: 265

• Iowa: 265

• New York: 265

• South Dakota: 265

• Mississippi: 264

• Montana: 264

• New Hampshire: 264

• North Carolina: 264

• South Carolina: 264

• Florida: 263

• Kentucky: 263

• Nebraska: 263

• New Mexico: 263

• Wyoming: 263

• Alaska: 262

• Nevada: 262

• Arkansas: 261

• Missouri: 261

• Oregon: 261

• Alabama: 260

• Delaware: 260

• Kansas: 260

• Michigan: 260

• North Dakota: 260

• Vermont: 258

• Oklahoma: 257

• Maine: 256

• West Virginia: 248

The White American national average is: 266

On this basis, I equated a score of 266 to an IQ of 100 since that is the average White American IQ and my calculation formula is IQ = 100 + 2.66 × z where z = (score - dataset mean) / dataset SD. Here are the results:

District of Columbia: 112.5
DoDEA: 107.0
Massachusetts: 103.4
Connecticut: 103.0
New Jersey: 103.0
Hawaii: 102.6
Colorado: 102.3
Maryland: 101.9
Georgia: 101.5
Illinois: 101.1
California: 100.7
Indiana: 100.7
Rhode Island: 100.7
Arizona: 100.3
Louisiana: 99.9
Ohio: 99.9
Texas: 99.9
Washington: 99.9
Minnesota: 99.5
Pennsylvania: 99.5
Tennessee: 99.5
Utah: 99.5
Virginia: 99.5
Wisconsin: 99.5
Idaho: 99.1
Iowa: 99.1
New York: 99.1
South Dakota: 99.1
Mississippi: 98.7
Montana: 98.7
New Hampshire: 98.7
North Carolina: 98.7
South Carolina: 98.7
Florida: 98.3
Kentucky: 98.3
Nebraska: 98.3
New Mexico: 98.3
Wyoming: 98.3
Alaska: 97.9
Nevada: 97.9
Arkansas: 97.5
Missouri: 97.5
Oregon: 97.5
Alabama: 97.2
Delaware: 97.2
Kansas: 97.2
Michigan: 97.2
North Dakota: 97.2
Vermont: 96.4
Oklahoma: 96.0
Maine: 95.6
West Virginia: 92.3

Here is an IQ map of White Americans based on the earlier estimations.

And here is the IQ map of all races for comparison (not sure how accurate it is tbh).

As you can see, there are several notable discrepancies. Most notably, the Northeast and West Virginia are ranked much lower on my map than they are on other maps without a coherent methodology, given that even SAT scores poorly capture what I see online.

One curious finding is that my map correlates better with GDP per capita than the ones I found online. Just take a look at Maine, Vermont and West Virginia and tell me whether my map correlates with it better or whether you believe West Virginian IQ is around 98 as it is claimed online.

Nonetheless there is room for improvement as I looked only at the math scores, without combining it with reading scores. I also could not find a racial breakdown of SAT by race in each state either. If you want to design a better map, you know how to do it. You should at least start by averaging math and reading scores obtained from the same website.

Let me know if I should return to more data posting like I used to in the past or do you prefer my analysis of the current events.

The positives were: Kindness, mercy, compassion, Openness, friendliness, sociability, Patience, humility, all-forgiveness, Patriotism, Strength of spirit, endurance, resilience, Honesty, decency, fairness, Courage, bravery, valor, Mutual aid, desire to help, Hospitality, warmth/welcoming nature, Simplicity, trustfulness, naivety, Determination, persistence, purposefulness, “We’re all human, people are different, it doesn’t depend on nationality”, Cohesion, unity, Optimism, cheerfulness, faith in the best, Diligence, hard work, Good manners, respectfulness, attentiveness, Calmness, balance, restraint, Selflessness, generosity.

The negatives were: Alcoholism, smoking, drug addiction, Laziness, Excessive trustfulness, simplicity, naivety, Aggressiveness, malice, Excessive kindness, pity/compassion, all-forgiveness, long-suffering, Irresponsibility, Rudeness, boorishness, lack of culture, impudence, Egoism, indifference, Disunity, lack of mutual assistance, Apathy, inertia, passivity.

My own outlook is a little bit different and you’ll soon read it. Ideally, this should turn into a series of exploring the Russian national character, but I don’t know how many of you would actually appreciate this type of content.

The most interesting revelation was how people of a different educational background answered these questions. For example, on the question asking: “What do you think: are Russians more characterized by rationality/reasonableness or by emotionality?”, majority of those without a proper education picked rationality (50 vs 35) whereas those with bachelor degrees or above picked emotionality (50 vs 37).

My own sociological portrait of Russians is that they do tend to be emotional and I am glad that EHC shares my own observation.

Another interesting thing is that those who believe that Russians tend to be more hardworking than lazy grew from 50% in 2013 to 58% in 2025, which has coincided with objective economical developments such as the decline in unemployment.

Another question asking Russians whether Russians as a whole tend to be cautious or trusting Russian EHC confirmed my own observations once again:

LHC: (Trusting: 46%, Cautiousness 47%)

EHC: (Trusting: 60%, Cautiousness 29%)

On the question asking whether Russians tend to be gullible or cunning, just 13% of EHC believe that Russians tend to be cunning while LHC answered 22%.

Finally on the question asking “Do you think Russian people are more inclined to embrace change or to be conservative?” EHC was once again on point.

LHC: (Embracing Change: 51%, Conservative 32%)

EHC: Embracing Change: 26%, Conservative 58%)

TLDR: LHC Russians tend to have a distorted, overly flattering self-perception of their national character, whereas Elite Human Capital observers are generally far more accurate particularly when assessing its negative traits, even though EHC Russians tend to be far more jingoistic and supportive of Pvtin than LHC Russians.

Unfortunately the poll didn’t do a lot of breaking down by levels of education, as well as had a fairly limited number of character traits which were often repeating. As I result I had to dig further:

I asked Advanced Grok AI to give me top 5 best and worst stereotypes about Russians as serotypes tend to be highly accurate:

Negative Stereotypes :

1. Russians are aggressive, brutal, and violent

2. Russians are heavy drinkers / alcoholics who drink vodka like water

3. Russians never smile / are unfriendly, rude, and humorless

4. Russians are all tied to the mafia / organized crime

5. Russians are poor, backward, living in gray/squalor with bad quality everything

Positives Stereotypes :

1. Russians are incredibly resilient, tough, and enduring

2. Russian women are exceptionally beautiful

3. Russians are deeply hospitable and generous

4. Russians have a rich cultural heritage / soulful depth

5. Russians are highly patriotic and proud

I tend to agree with Grok’s assessment with some caveats: “Russians are all tied to the mafia / organized crime” is clearly ridiculous and unironically a maliciously perpetrated lie by Hollywood while “Russians are heavy drinkers / alcoholics who drink vodka like water” is true of the past but according to recent CIA estimations Russia’s present level of consumption of alcohol is at 7.29 liters of pure alcohol per person, whereas France’s is 11.44 and the United States’ at 8.93.

I would also dispute that “Russians are deeply hospitable and generous” but that’s just me and my own lived experiences, although perhaps, they are in relation to Americans and their gay individualism.

That being said, observations about Russians from the outside tend to be more accurate than from the inside, because those who are living within the culture perceive what is around them as the norm. Only constant comparisons between various groups are able to determine what a norm is,.

Due to psychological self-defense mechanisms few Russians are able to look at themselves through the lens of the other whereas many of those who do, become addicted to seeing the world through the eyes of the other.

As a person who sees Russians through in-group as well as out-group lenses, these are my own observations of the Russian national character and its many traits:

• Self-Sacrifice (+)

• Unlawful (-)

• Toleration (терпимость) of hierarchy (-)

• De-politization (-)

• Conservative (N)

• Atomization (-)

• Grandiose (+)

• Prideful (N)

• Negative Ethnocentrism (N)

• Non-ideological (N)

• Chaotic (N)

• Gullible (N)

• Soulful (+)

• Resilient and Enduring (+)

• Stubborn (-)

• Easily Assimilable (N)

• Imperial (N)

I counted 4 positive traits, 5 negative ones and 8 neutral ones, although there is some justification to put Prideful and Negatively Ethnocentric into the positive category while gullible, chaotic and non-ideological could go into the negative category (depending on one’s preference, just like me putting toleration of authoritarianism/hierarchy as a negative and grandiose as a positive).

I believe that the Russian national character is more negative than it is positive. In contrast just 2% of Russians share my assessment, while 59% believe that the positives in the Russian character outweigh its negatives. The remaining 37% believe that the Russian character is about equally positive and negative.

In my article analyzing Russian Canadians, I concluded that they would be an ideal population to support and be governed by capitalist-style authoritarians, given their strong non-ideological bent, moderate authoritarian leanings, and combination of social traditionalism with fiscal conservatism which is what the current Russian state happens to be with some minor caveats.

As you can see by looking at the example of Russian Canadians, elevated de-politization persists even in Canada and it cannot solely be explained by appealing to Russia’s broken institutions, political oppression or other typical go-to explanations.

I came up with more traits but I am not as confident in them as I was in the previous list, some of them are even contradictory:

• Self-destruction though nihilism

• Creative

• Cruel/Violent

• Punctual (my own observation but may not be true of the general population)

• Lazy/Hardworking (contradictory I know)

• Autonomous (similar to Atomization)

• Traditional gender roles (Russian family unit strongly exhibits traditionally feminine and masculine modes of behavior, however this doesn’t stop them from sleeping around, having illegitimate children and poor marriages)

• Cold (not really true once you get to know them, it would be better to just say unfriendly)

• Emotional

• Mercy

• Conspiratorial

• Inferiority complex

• Unorthodox

I would appreciate some feedback to this, if you can’t comment under this post you can find me at a number of places: Telegram, YouTube and X. There are definitely things that I have missed although I’ve spent quite some time thinking about it.

I’d like to also apologize for not posting for these many days, I am quite busy with work and personal stuff that I can’t comment upon. On the bright side, I made it up by being unusually active on YouTube.

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The philosophy of Clavicular centers on the belief that physical appearance is the primary currency of social and personal success, contending that aesthetic appeal dictates the totality of human worth. In this framework, moral convictions and political ideologies are secondary to the primordial hierarchy of optics which is what determines a person’s social worth.

This mode of thought emerges as both a reaction against modern women’s dating standards and a repudiation of the incel movement, which is deeply entrenched in blackpill fatalism.

Clavicular’s philosophy synthesizes a clear acknowledgment that appearance does matter with a decisive rejection of the blackpill. Instead of the Blackpill, Clavicular is advocating for ascension through looksmaxxing.

Where Clavicular departs from incel ideology is in its understanding of ascension: it is not undertaken merely for mate attraction. The primary purpose of ascension is domination—to mog. For those of you who are not internet savvy enough, Mog comes from the original term, AMOG, which meant Alpha Male of the Group which was popular in PUA forms. Over time, it slowly turned into “mog” and became a more of a verb, rather than a noun. However, connotatively, it means to outshine someone.

This shift from “attraction” to “domination” marks a critical turning point in internet subcultures. While the traditional “redpill” was a survival strategy designed to navigate the existing sexual marketplace, Clavicular’s “mogging” is an offensive strategy designed to break it. It is the transition from a beggar seeking a seat at the table to a conqueror seeking to flip the table entirely. This is why his rhetoric resonates so deeply with a generation of young men who feel genetically disenfranchised; it offers them a path to power that doesn’t require the permission of a partner.

To quote Nick Fuentes:

That is precisely what makes it Nietzschean, ascension is done for the purpose of social domination, not for the purpose of attracting a mate. Showing one’s superiority becomes an end in and of itself.

In the following segment I will talk about the socio-political implications of this emerging thought pattern and why it’s generally anti-social (and no, that’s not because Clavicular encourages his followers to use drugs!).

By the end of the article, I provide my own evolutionary guide to ascension which I call the Progressive Ascension.

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